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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON FOREIGN AID AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TAX EFFORT 
 
By 
 
LEANORA ALECIA BROWN 
 
AUGUST 2012 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This dissertation comprises two essays that attempt to determine, empirically, the 
fiscal response of governments’ to international assistance. The first essay examines 
whether an increasingly popular recommendation in international aid policy to switch 
from tied foreign assistance to untied foreign assistance affects investment in critical 
development expenditure sectors by developing countries. In the past, most international 
aid has been in the form of tied assistance as donors believed that tying aid will improve 
its effectiveness. It has been argued, that if tied aid is well designed and effectively 
managed then its overall effectiveness can be improved. On the contrary, it is also 
believed that tied aid acts as an impediment to donor cooperation and the building of 
partnership with developing countries. In addition, it is also argued that it removes the 
‘feeling’ of ownership and responsibility of projects from partner countries in aid 
supported development. Two other more popular arguments used to challenge the 
effectiveness of foreign aid is that it is compromised when tied to the goods and services 
of the donor countries because almost 30 percent of its value is eliminated and also 
because it does not allow recipient countries to act on their priorities for public spending. 
 xii 
 
These problems bring into question whether tied aid is truly the most effective way to 
help poor countries. A recommendation by the international community is that a switch to 
untied aid would be necessary. With untied aid, the recipient country is not obligated to 
buy the goods of the donor country neither is it compelled to pursue the public 
expenditure priorities of donors. Instead with untied aid they will have greater flexibility 
over spending decisions and can more easily pursue the priorities of their countries as 
they see fit. Hence, one could expect that a one dollar increase in untied aid will increase 
spending in the critical priority sectors by more than a one dollar increase in tied 
assistance. The question therefore is whether national domestic priorities coincide or not 
with what the international community has traditionally deemed should be priority. 
Empirically, we test this prediction using country-by-country data for 57 countries for the 
period 1973 to 2006. The results suggest that on average untied aid has a greater impact 
on pro-poor spending than do tied aid.  In addition, the results also suggest that 
fungibility is still an issue even after accounting for the effects of untied aid. However, 
one could argue that fungibility may not be as bad as it appears since the switch to untied 
aid improves spending in the sectors that are essential for growth and development. 
The second essay explores the hypothesis that the expectations of debt 
forgiveness can discourage developing countries from attaining fiscal independence 
through an improvement of their tax effort.  On the one hand, the international financial 
community typically advises poor countries to improve revenue mobilization but, on the 
other hand, the same international community routinely continues to bail-out poor 
countries that fail to meet their loan repayment obligations. The act of bailing-out these 
countries creates an expectation on the part of developing country governments that they 
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will receive debt forgiveness time and again in the future. Therefore, the expectation of 
future bail outs creates a moral hazard that leads to endemic lower tax efforts. The key 
prediction of our simple theoretical model is that in the presence of debt forgiveness, tax 
ratios will decline and this decline will be stronger the higher the frequency and intensity 
of the bailouts. Empirically, we test this prediction using country-level data for 66 
countries for the period 1989 to 2006. The results strongly suggest that debt forgiveness 
plays a significant role in the low tax effort observed in developing countries.  Our 
empirical model allows for the endogeneity of tax effort and debt forgiveness. 
Interestingly we find that more debt forgiveness is actually provided to countries with 
lower tax effort. The results are robust to various specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 An ongoing debate taking place at the international political level, as well as 
among bilateral and multilateral donors is the need for a drastic increase in the amount of 
aid reaching developing countries. This need for ‘more aid’ is justified on the grounds 
that it will help developing countries, including the least hopeful African ones; achieve 
some level of targeted growth and development. In this dissertation I highlight the 
importance of the ‘form’ of this increased aid as a crucial determinant of how effective it 
will be in assisting poor countries achieve social and economic progress. The ubiquitous 
argument among those in the international financing community is that more aid should 
be disbursed in the form of untied aid as opposed to the more commonly used tied aid or 
categorical aid. The decision to move towards untied aid is fuelled by the idea that this 
type of aid allows for greater flexibility in spending decisions since it neither obligates 
the recipient to buy the products of the donor nor does it require them to spend it 
according to the priorities of these donor.    
While it is recognized that an increased amount of aid is what will be needed to 
assist these countries, it is also important to recognize that ‘more aid’ can sometimes 
have detrimental effects on a country. Increasing amounts of aid means a greater debt 
burden for the recipient country. This increased debt burden often proves to be too 
onerous for some, if not all of these countries and as such they may face extreme 
difficulty trying to keep-up with debt servicing costs. More often than not these countries 
must be forgiven these debts to help them break from the vicious cycle of poverty in 
which they find themselves. Needless to say, this situation fosters an expectation, on the 
part of recipient governments’ that debt forgiveness may be received time and again in 
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the future. This expectation can in turn induce a moral hazard problem whereby indebted 
poor countries have little or no incentive to increase their own tax effort to repay loans 
and provide critical social services. Therefore, an overarching issue in this dissertation is 
that this increased aid disbursement to developing countries could require more and more 
debt forgiveness which could subsequently give rise to an endemic lower tax effort 
among these countries. 
 This dissertation comprises two essays that attempt to address the issues raised 
above. The essays are inextricably linked by the concepts of ‘aid, fungibility and tax 
effort.’ The first essay seeks to determine, empirically, whether the switch from tied to 
untied aid will increase expenditure in areas most beneficial to the lowest income group 
within a country. Further to this investigation, I also analyze whether this change in the 
composition of foreign aid changes the extent or degree of fungibility. From the existing 
literature, it is gleaned that the effectiveness of tied aid is compromised by either the 
extent of fungibility or the above average price that must be paid for the products or 
services of donor countries to which the aid monies are tied.  
Therefore, with the recent thrust by the international community to move away 
from tied aid and towards issuing more untied aid, it now becomes imperative that we 
take account of the influence of untied aid not only on public expenditures but also on the 
overall extent of fungibility. Due to data limitation issues, public expenditures are 
grouped into two broad categories, namely: the ‘pro-poor expenditure’1 category and the 
                                                          
1
 Pro-poor expenditure is a general category of expenditures that include spending in areas such as 
education, health and housing & community amenities. I aggregated these categories because of data 
limitation in the individual expenditure categories.  This categorization is previously used by Gomanee et 
al. (2005). They argue that spending in these sectors will likely be more beneficial to individuals in the 
poorest income group as such they refer to this group as pro-poor spending.  
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‘other expenditure’2 category. The analysis is carried out using 57 countries; however, the 
estimation is done on a country-by-country basis. This approach is implemented for two 
main reasons. First, the way fungibility is defined in the first essay requires that we 
compute the beta estimate of untied aid on expenditure categories and subsequently 
include these estimates in the fungibility measure. Second, this approach is justified on 
the basis that we are now able to compare fungibility estimates found in this essay with 
those found in other papers.   
 Therefore, the key contribution of this essay is to include a measure of untied aid 
in the empirical analysis to ascertain whether the standard of living of the lowest income 
group tend to improve as a result of more untied aid. In addition, an interest is also there 
to see how this potential switch affects the overall extent of fungibility given that 
recipient governments now have greater leeway and freedom to spend ‘legally’ fungible 
funds (that is, the untied aid monies) according to their own national priorities and not 
according to the priorities or ‘special enthusiasms’ of the donors.  
 The empirical technique utilized in this essay is seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) which allows for the heterogeneous character of aid to investigate whether 
recipient governments behave differently depending on whether they receive tied or 
untied aid. Interestingly, a few of the countries in my sample experience increased 
expenditures as a result of the inflow of ‘unattached funds’ and the magnitude of these 
estimates are sometimes larger than the estimates observed for tied aid. Still, there are 
countries for which a negative impact of untied aid is observed indicating that not only 
                                                          
2
 Other expenditure is another general category of expenditures that include spending in areas such as 
general public service, public order and safety, recreational, cultural and religious affairs and services and 
economic affairs and services. I use a similar rationale to aggregate the data in one group called ‘other 
expenditure’ category.   
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did the recipient government not spend any of the ‘free money’ in the sectors apt to 
benefit the lowest income groups but they even reduce their own spending in these 
sectors. Finally, I incorporate the country-specific estimates for untied aid in the 
fungibility measure. There is evidence of smaller fungibility estimates for some of the 
countries in the sample.  
The second essay is an attempt to get a better understanding of whether the type 
of aid flow –in this case, debt forgiveness – interacts with a developing country tax effort 
in a perverse way that could result in a compromise of the fiscal landscape in that 
country. A lot of empirical work has been done that attempts to identify different factors
3
 
that could possibly explain the endemic lower tax effort witnessed among these countries. 
While these factors seem to provide some explanation for the low tax effort observed, 
there are no studies that investigate to what extent the otherwise well-intentioned actions 
of the international financial community can be an important cause of the low tax effort 
observed among developing countries.   
 Therefore, the objective of this second essay is twofold. First, we want to 
determine whether the expectation of debt forgiveness actually discourage developing 
countries from attaining fiscal space through an improvement of their tax effort. And 
second, because of the possibility of reverse causation, I also want to determine whether 
countries with lower tax ratios are provided with more debt forgiveness. This analysis is 
done at a macro level using cross country panel data.  
 The key prediction of our simple theoretical model is that in the presence of debt 
forgiveness, tax ratios will decline and this decline will be stronger the higher the 
                                                          
3
 Previous studies include other factors such as corruption, governance, tax rates, income inequality, 
external debt, loans, grants and administrative factors among others as possible explanation for the low tax 
effort observed.  
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frequency and intensity of the bailouts. To test this hypothesis, we use a country level 
dataset of debt forgiveness derived as the accumulated stock of debt forgiven which does 
not include the amounts for either debt buybacks or debt swaps, which in effect are just 
debt relief.
4
 We argue that the expectations of debt forgiveness could generate a moral 
hazard situation that could ultimately discourage developing country governments from 
improving their tax collection efforts, and hence lowering their tax ratios.  
Our empirical model allows for the endogeneity of both tax effort and debt 
forgiveness. Three different methods are used to test the hypotheses in this essay, 
namely: two-stage-least-squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM) and 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. It is important to highlight here that while these 
three methods are testing different specifications of the model, they are all employed to 
address shortcomings encountered with each individually. Interestingly, all three methods 
reveal that more debt forgiveness is actually provided to countries with lower tax effort. 
We theorize that this ‘negative’ effect of debt forgiveness on tax ratios is possible, 
especially in light of the fact that a ‘one-off’ round of debt forgiveness could trigger 
expectations that more forgiveness will be received time and again in the future. 
Therefore, not having these loan repayment obligations could mean that government 
officials in these countries have little or no incentive to improve the current tax system to 
collect adequate amounts of revenue or increase their current intake. We also hypothesize 
that the international financing community may be perpetuating this low tax ratio 
                                                          
4
 In the literature, debt relief and debt forgiveness are sometimes used interchangeably. There are other 
instances where debt relief is defined to include debt forgiveness (which represents a real reduction in the 
stock of outstanding debt) along with debt buyback, debt for equity swaps or other rescheduling schemes. 
These latter two, however, do not reduce the overall debt stock but is just a mere deferment of repayment 
obligations which must ultimately be honored at a later agreed upon date. Alesina and Weder (2002) is one 
such study that defines ‘‘debt relief’’ to include both debt forgiveness and debt rescheduling. Still, there are 
some studies that treat debt relief as a different variable from debt forgiveness (Neumayer, 2002; 
Ndikumana, 2004; Bird and Powell, 2010).  
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situation by continuously providing debt forgiveness to countries with lower tax effort. 
And as suspected, we find evidence in support of this hypothesis.  
  
  
 7 
 
ESSAY 1 
 
FUNGIBILITY AND THE IMPACT OF UNTIED DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE: EVIDENCE FROM 57 COUNTRIES 
 
 
 “Rich countries pursue their own fixations and fads….They tie aid so that it can only be 
used to buy the donor’s own products or services – effectively reducing the value of aid 
by as much as 30 percent…” Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa (2005, p.58) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 With the 2015 deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) fast approaching and progress towards achieving these goals being at best 
uneven, international organizations have recognized the need to scale-up assistance to 
developing countries by providing additional financing. The provision of this additional 
assistance caused ODA flows to developing countries to more than double between 1990 
and 2005. ODA flows stood at approximately $38 billion (in USD) in 1990 and increased 
to just over $82 billion (in USD) in 2005, a more that 100 percent increase.
5
 The 
International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in March 2002 was 
one such initiative responsible for the dramatic increase in international aid, which 
continued with other initiatives, namely, the UN Millennium Project Report (2005) and 
the Report for the Commission of Africa (2005).  
The Monterrey consensus in particular, sought to revamp the aid agenda since 
there was ubiquitous agreement that more aid to developing countries was needed to meet 
the Millennium Development Goals. One of the conditions for increasing aid flows was 
                                                          
5
 See http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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that progress needs to be made on the “aid effectiveness”6 front. However, after 40 years 
of development aid, the majority of evidence still indicates a failure of foreign aid to 
achieve the targeted growth and development outcomes.  
For many years, a large percentage of development aid has been tied aid. There 
are typically two aspects to tied aid: first, the use of funds for specific purposes and 
second, that the funds are used for goods and services provided by the donor.  In recent 
times the ‘idea’ of tied aid has not been well received by aid recipients or within the 
international community. Two often cited problems with tied aid are that it tends to be 
very fungible
7
 anyway when it is earmarked for a specific purpose and that it attracts a 
hefty mark-up on the price of the goods and services sold to the recipients of this type of 
aid. It is widely argued that these abovementioned problems may be partially responsible 
for the inferior results observed in the literature vis-à-vis untied aid. Further, it is also the 
belief that tied aid acts as both an impediment to donor cooperation and the building of 
partnerships with developing countries. In addition, tied aid is said to have removed the 
‘feeling’ of ownership and responsibility of ‘projects’ from partner countries in aid 
supported development as well as to hamper the broader efforts of promoting their 
integration into the global economy (ODI, 2008).  
It is against this background that tied aid has become the less popular and 
presumably the less effective means of delivering development assistance to recipient 
                                                          
6
 Aid effectiveness is the effectiveness of development aid in achieving economic or human development. 
According to Quartey (2005), the effectiveness of aid is defined in terms of aid’s contribution to poverty 
alleviation or sustained poverty reduction. Another view of aid effectiveness is that, if it is used as intended 
then it should contribute to sustained economic growth in the recipient countries. However, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), argued that the only way for foreign assistance to contribute to the growth successes of 
recipient economies is if these economies have a ‘good policy’ environment to effectively absorb the aid 
moneys.   
7
 Fungibility is the situation in which the aid–recipient government reduces its own resources from the 
sector which receives aid and channels them to other sectors of the budget. Fungibility arises because the 
objectives or preferences of the donors differ from those of the recipient.   
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governments. As a result of this dissatisfaction, the DAC-OECD committee has come to 
use more untied aid. The problem here is not fungibility per se any longer because untied 
aid is precisely that, it is legally fungible. Now, beyond the old question of fungibility, 
the issue has become whether the change in the composition of international aid from tied 
to untied aid has been effective in achieving the targeted growth and development 
outcomes. In particular, the question has become whether untied aid has been more 
effective in sustaining or increasing expenditures in the particular critical sectors that are 
generally thought can lead to growth and development.  
The effect of using untied aid as opposed to tied aid in particular development 
sectors is of chief importance to both policymakers and researchers alike. The interest in 
this issue stems from the fact that the budgetary impact of untied foreign aid must be 
understood before any final assessment concerning its effectiveness can be determined. It 
is postulated that untied aid allows for greater flexibility in spending decisions made by 
recipient governments which is not the case with tied aid. The DAC Recommendations 
therefore provide the unique opportunity for such a study to be undertaken since donor 
countries has already untied over four fifths (82%) of their ODA to LDCs, against a 60 
percent benchmark for untying bilateral aid (ODI, 2008). Also, the extent of untying of 
bilateral aid to LDCs was substantially greater than for non-LDCs (70%). If (untied) 
multilateral aid is taken into account, then 85 percent of all ODA was untied in 2006.  
Needless to say, the effectiveness of untied foreign assistance hinges on how the 
recipient governments spend this money. Since most of these inflows go to the public 
sector of recipient countries, any understanding of aid’s broader macroeconomic impacts 
must extend beyond an understanding of the impact of categorical aid on categorical 
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expenditure. This extension must include an understanding of the effects of using untied 
aid on specific public expenditures. However, a review of the literature on untied aid 
shows that there has been little formal investigation of the impact of untying (non-sector 
specific aid). This can be explained firstly by the fact that before the mid-1990s more 
than 50 percent of aid was tied and secondly because donor countries failed to report 
consistently the disbursement of untied aid.
8
 Therefore, it is both understandable and 
appropriate, that a large body of the existing empirical literature focused on the 
relationship between sectoral aid inflows and spending in those sectors so targeted by aid 
donors. Also, from this empirical literature one can unambiguously conclude that aid is 
sometimes not used in the sector for which it was granted (such as health or education), 
and donors end up financing something completely different than intended (such as 
military expenditures). In this sense recipients are said to have been ‘funging’ foreign aid.   
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is as follows: firstly, I will 
assess the effectiveness of untied aid versus tied aid in increasing spending in the pro-
poor and ‘other’ expenditure categories of the recipient economies. I will do so by 
exploring the budgetary response of recipient governments to both tied and untied foreign 
assistance. The main rationale for taking into account these two different components of 
aid is that they have different ‘strings’ attached to them. Indeed, tied aid is earmarked for 
specific sectors and recipient governments have little flexibility in deciding how these 
funds must be used. In contrast, untied aid allows for greater flexibility in spending 
decisions since it neither obligates the recipient to buy the products of the donor nor does 
it require them to spend it according to the wishes of the donor. To test whether untied 
aid and tied aid affect differently the behavior of the government, I utilize a seemingly 
                                                          
8
 See (ODI, 2008) - Tied Aid disciplines: LDCs 50% concessionality; others 35% concessionality. 
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unrelated regression (SUR) model, with separate accounting for the heterogeneous 
characteristics of aid. Secondly, I contribute to the foreign aid effectiveness and 
fungibility literature through investigating the impact of untied aid on sector specific 
categories of expenditure that some years back were the specific focus of tied aid.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In section two I present a 
review of the literature. A simple theoretical model of fungibility is presented in section 
three followed by the empirical model and a description of the data in sections four and 
five respectively. In section six I will present the results and finally section seven 
concludes the paper with a summary of key findings and policy implications emanating 
from the results.  
 
Literature Review 
 
The Effects of Untied Aid 
 
The 2001 DAC Recommendation led to extensive untying of ODA. Prior to this 
period, the larger proportion of aid was either tied to specific development expenditure 
sectors which donors were willing to finance [Hendra, 1987; Pack and Pack, 1993; Khilji 
and Zampelli, 1994; Pettersson, 2007; van de Walle and Mu, 2007; and Wagstaff, 2011] 
or tied to the exports of donor countries [Baffour, 1999; Arvin, Cater and Choudhry, 
2000; Svensson, 1999; Quartey 2005]. Thus, much of the earlier literature focused on the 
consequences of sector-specific aid and/or aid tied to donors’ export. The empirical 
literature on untied aid, in contrast is sparse.  
Of the few studies that examine the impact of untied aid on recipient countries, 
the focus is mainly on the welfare effects of this transfer (e.g Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 
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2004; Michael and van Marewijk, 1998; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky, 2007). These analyses conclude that under ‘plausible conditions’, untied aid 
benefits the recipient and the world economy more than tied aid. Also, the few studies 
carried out seem to have focused on the impact of untying from the donor’s perspective 
rather than the recipient’s perspective.  
 Michael and van Marewijk (1998) is one of the few studies that examines the 
issue of untying from both the donor’s and the recipient’s perspective. They examine the 
welfare effects of tied aid versus untied aid on the transfer of capital from donor 
governments to recipient governments. This analysis was done for individual countries as 
well as for a panel of countries. They find that the individual countries in their sample 
enjoy higher benefits when aid is untied than when it is tied, providing that the rental 
rates of capital are the same in both countries. In addition to this, they also find that a 
transfer of aid tied to intersectorally mobile capital is worse than untied aid. A similar 
study conducted by Chatterjee et al. (2003) reveals findings that somewhat supports the 
findings of Michael and van Marewijk (1998). They find that a permanent pure or untied 
transfer is always welfare improving, while a tied transfer is welfare deteriorating and is 
particularly harmful if it involves domestic co-financing. A later study by Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky (2004) examine the impact of untied transfer versus tied transfer on 
consumption, leisure and debt reduction. They conclude that untied transfer is initially 
applied primarily to debt reduction, which allows an immediate substantial increase in 
consumption, increasing the marginal utility of leisure, and thus inducing an immediate 
sharp reduction in labor supply. Hence it is shown that untied transfers results in a more 
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uniform increase in consumption and leisure, resulting in an almost constant 
improvement in welfare.  
The debate over the effectiveness of sector specific aid versus general aid has also 
given rise to a normative literature based on case studies. For example, Quartey (2005) 
sees budgetary support as a way to overcome the problems of tied aid. He argues that 
tying aid to goods and services supplied exclusively by donor country businesses or 
agencies will not benefit the poor in the recipient country, since such tying is seen as a 
way of pursuing the commercial self-interests of the donor. He argues that aid can be 
designed in many ways to pursue the commercial objectives of donors; one pervasive 
means is the insistence on donor country products. Further, he argues that aid recipients 
would agree that tied aid is costly; it distorts agreed priorities, burdens governments with 
ever-increasing recurrent local costs and invites corruption. For example, in the case of 
Ghana, Baffour (1999) estimated the price differentials between aid imports and non-aid 
imports at an average cost of US$40 million per year during the 1990-1997 period.  
Another problem with tied aid, according to Quartey (2005), is that it does not strengthen 
local capacity because service contracts are usually single-sourced and do not involve 
local contractors. Svensson (1999) also provides a similar argument against the use of 
tied aid to ‘advance’ a recipient countries economic and social agenda. Hendra (1987) 
contrasts Canada’s bilateral development assistance (highly tied) with Scandinavian 
practices (more untied) and highlights the superiority of the latter.  
Other studies that focus on the use of tied aid versus untied aid offer some useful 
insights on the growth potential of the latter. Miquel-Florensa (2007) evaluates the 
differential effects of tied and untied aid on growth using a panel of 70 developing 
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countries for the period 1970-1997. He concludes that aid effectiveness is not 
significantly different for these two types of aid. However, when he conditioned aid on 
policies he finds that untied aid has a greater impact on growth than does tied aid.  
 Another strand of this literature focuses on the effect of untied assistance on 
donor country exports. Arvin, Cater and Choudhry (2000) examine this relationship using 
German aid figures to 85 developing countries for the period 1973-1995. They argue that 
the provision of untied aid, through the generation of goodwill, may result in increased 
donor exports to the recipient. The results for the full sample suggest that German untied 
aid has a positive causal impact on its exports to LDCs. This result offers support for 
their goodwill hypothesis that German untied assistance creates goodwill and promotes 
exports in a manner analogous to how a firm creates goodwill and generates sales through 
advertising.   
  In conclusion, the review of the literature on untied aid broadly shows that there 
has been little formal investigation on whether untied aid is more effective in increasing 
spending in particular sectors and in obtaining certain outcomes. Studies differ in scope, 
coverage and methodology and findings cannot be generalized. Therefore, more 
empirical study is needed in order to draw some conclusions, especially with respect to 
the impact of untying of aid on how funds are spent through the government budget. 
 
The Effects of Tied Aid 
 
The group of studies that examine the impact of categorical foreign aid on public 
expenditures report results that are mixed with respect to targeting. For example, Pack 
and Pack (1990) in their study of Dominican Republic find that total expenditures 
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increase by less than the aid amount.
9
 This is evidence that categorical foreign aid is 
indeed fungible. Interestingly however, Pack and Pack (1993) after conducting a similar 
analysis in Indonesia, find that total expenditures increases by more than the total amount 
of aid directed at the public expenditure sectors: a different result than in Dominican 
Republic. Now, a question of interest is what makes aid more fungible in one country 
than in another country? Pack and Pack argue that evidence of aid fungibility in 
Dominican Republic is explained by the fiscal picture in that country. The more 
important is foreign aid as a source of public revenues, the greater the ability of donors to 
monitor changes in expenditure and therefore the more likely are the recipient’s 
expenditures to reflect donor intentions. In the Dominican Republic, foreign aid, on 
average over the observed period, was about 1 percent of GDP, while foreign aid 
represented about 4 percent of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product.  
Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) using pooled time-series cross-section data for a 
sample of 46 countries for the period 1975-1983 also find an ambiguous effect of foreign 
aid on public expenditures. They find that aid that are provided at rates closer to market 
rates results in a less than one dollar increase in non-defense non debt public expenditure. 
Specifically, these loans are referred to as hard loans. On the other hand, loans provided 
at highly concessional rates seem to have increased expenditures by more than one dollar. 
These loans are referred to as soft loans. Instead of focusing only on the effects of 
multilateral foreign aid, Cashel-Cordo et al. (1990) also test whether bilateral loans and 
                                                          
9
 Pack and Pack [1990; 1993] also attempt to account for the sectoral impacts of foreign aid on respective 
public expenditure sectors. They find that fungibility does not affect some expenditure categories while it 
affects others. Particularly, they find that the calculated change in development expenditures in health, 
education and social services is greater than the amount of aid allocated to those sectors in Dominican 
Republic. Also, in a later study on Indonesia, they find evidence of non-fungibility of foreign aid in 
Industry, mining and electric power and the transportation and tourism sectors in that country.  
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grants that are tied to particular expenditure categories have any effect on public 
expenditure.
10
 They find that ODA bilateral loans and bilateral grants from DAC 
countries have no significant effect on the public sector budget.
11
  
Extending the line of research on the impact of foreign aid on government 
expenditures, Pettersson (2007), van de Walle and Mu (2007), Wagstaff (2009) and 
Khilji and Zampelli (1994) examine, in particular, the effects of categorical foreign aid 
on categorical public spending. Using a panel of 57 developing countries from 1973 to 
2006, Pettersson (2007) attempts to identify whether sectoral aid is spent in the targeted 
sector. He finds evidence of substantial diversion of sectoral aid away from the targeted 
sectors. Likewise, Khilji and Zampelli (1994) study how military and non-military 
foreign aid from a specific donor institution affect the allocation of spending in those 
sectors for 8 recipient countries over the period 1972-1987. While the results strongly 
suggest that both military assistance and non-military assistance are fungible, there is 
substantially less fungibility of non-military aid than of military aid. The evidence of 
sectoral aid fungibility is also confirmed in a study by van de Walle and Mu (2007).  
They use commune- level data to test whether aid donated towards road rehabilitation in 
Vietnam was actually spent in that sector. They find that less than the targeted amount 
was spent rehabilitating the road network in that country. Also, Wagstaff (2009) studies 
the issue of fungibility of sectoral aid in the healthcare sector in Vietnam. He uses 
commune level data for 1997 and 2003 and show that this type of aid is apparently not 
                                                          
10
 One explanation given for this result is that bilateral aid provided by the DAC countries is seen primarily 
to be an alternative source of financing for the LDCs and as such has little impact on expenditure.  
11
 This result is explained by the idea that the entire grant amount is basically used to replace other sources 
of public revenue and so is returned by the recipient to the private sector. Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) 
argue that the only difference between bilateral loans and grants is that loans replace other borrowing, 
while grants replace internal taxes. 
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fungible between Vietnam’s healthcare sectors and others sectors, but is fungible across 
provinces within the healthcare sector. 
A burgeoning literature on the specific effects of tied concessional loans was later 
developed. Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) using a panel data set of 38 developing 
countries and data on net disbursement of concessional loans from both bilateral and 
multilateral sources, examine the extent of fungibility across sectors in these countries. 
They find that in their sample of countries, concessional loans are far more stimulative of 
total government expenditures than do total foreign aid, though they increase by less than 
one dollar. This result was also confirmed in a sub-sample of 14 of these 38 countries but 
with a greater impact. They find that total government expenditure increase by more than 
a dollar increase in net disbursement of concessional loans.
 12
 Hence, the results based on 
these samples of countries are mixed: fungible in the sample of the 38 countries and non-
fungible for the sample of 14 countries. The impact of concessional loans across 
expenditure sectors was also studied by Devarajan, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2000). They 
examine this issue in a sample of 18 sub-saharan African countries for the period 1971 to 
1995. They find evidence of non-funbility of concessional loans in some sectors, and 
argue that the matching requirements in those sectors allows for lower chance of 
diversion of funds away from them.  
 From these studies it is observed that foreign aid is fungible in some countries 
and some sectors but not in others. The review of the literature on tied aid broadly shows 
that this type of aid has not been very effective in achieving some of its stated goals. 
There have been problems with fungibility and an overall dissatisfaction with its overall 
                                                          
12
 One likely reason given for concessionary loans being more stimulative of government expenditure is the 
matching requirement attached to such financing. That is, for every dollar that a government spends on a 
specified activity, it gets a matching amount in concessionary loans.  
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effectiveness. Further, there are other negative effects documented about tied aid such 
that the international community is now engaged in a policy discourse about how best to 
help recipient countries. It is widely believed that tied aid acts as both an impediment to 
donor cooperation and the building of partnerships with developing countries. In 
addition, it removes the ‘feeling’ of ownership and responsibility of ‘projects’ from 
partner countries in aid supported development and finally, it hampers the broader efforts 
of promoting their integration into the global economy (ODI, 2008).  
 
A Simple Theoretical Model of Fungibility 
 
The basic assumption by donors that tied aid shifts a recipient government’ 
budget constraint according to the wishes of the donor is simply tenuous. For instance, if 
tied aid will increase the level of output beyond its current level, the aid recipient can 
reduce its own resources to the ‘newly’ subsidized good. This is the process of fungibility 
(see figure 1). The fundamental nature of the fungibility process has been documented in 
a number of studies. The illustration in this paper follows closely that of McGillivray et 
al. (2000). Let B represents the budget line before tied aid is received and let choice X 
represent the optimum, maximizing government utility subject to the budget constraint.  
Assume that the donor provides an allocation of A to be spent on roads, and let us also 
assume that this inflow is large relative to the recipient government’s budget. Then this 
will truncate the budget line: B’ becomes horizontal at Y. The recipient will be prevented 
from obtaining point Y (its optimum), expenditure on roads rises by more than would 
otherwise be the case (to R’’ rather than R’) and the extent of fungibility is reduced. In 
figure 1 the recipient can allocate no more than S’’ to schools. It should be noted that at 
Y’ the recipient is better off than without aid, although not at its optimum position, but 
 19 
 
not all aid actually goes to roads. If the donor were to restrict spending on schools to S, 
fungibility could be eliminated and all aid would go to roads. Again, note that the 
recipient is better off than at X. 
Figure 1.   A Simple Model of Fungibility
13
 
 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
The more recent aid fungibility studies build an equation system with public 
expenditures and public revenues subject to a budget constraint. This framework is used 
to answer the question whether foreign assistance that is tied to specific expenditure 
categories is actually spent in those targeted categories.  In this essay, we extend that 
framework to include untied foreign aid in the specification.  The rationale for including 
                                                          
13
 See McGillivray et al. (2000) 
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this type of assistance in the specification is to see whether recipient governments’ 
behavior changes depending on if they receive more foreign aid in the form of untied 
assistance. That is, with greater flexibility over their spending powers, will recipient 
governments now spend more money in the sectors that are potentially more beneficial to 
the lowest income groups in a society? The direction of this effect is expected to be 
positive signifying that recipient governments are indeed spending the now more flexible 
funds in the sectors thought to be apt to drive growth and development. While the 
direction of the coefficient estimate is important, the magnitude of this effect is equally or 
more significant since one expect to see more being spent out of a dollar of untied aid 
than out of a dollar of tied aid on public expenditures. The argument is that recipient 
governments will not be obligated to buy the goods of the donor or to pursue the ‘special 
enthusiasm’ of those donors but instead can pursue the national priorities of their 
respective countries including increased spending on social services and infrastructure. 
So that is, international donors may have the right priorities but they may get distorted 
through  
Due to data limitation in the individual expenditure categories, we categorize 
expenditures into two broad categories. These are ‘pro-poor expenditures’ and ‘other 
expenditures’ category14. These two development expenditure categories are then 
                                                          
14
 Pro-poor expenditure is a general category of expenditures that include spending in areas such as 
education, health and housing & community amenities. An aggregation of these categories was done 
because of data limitation in the individual expenditure sector.  This categorization is previously used by 
Gomanee et al. (2005) and Pettersson (2007). They argue that spending in these sectors will likely be more 
beneficial to individuals in the poorest income groups in society; as such they refer to it as the pro-poor 
expenditure category. The ‘other expenditure’ category is another general category of expenditures that 
include spending in areas such as general public service, public order and safety, recreational, cultural and 
religious affairs and services and economic affairs and services. Again, due to the scarcity of data in each 
of the individual expenditure category an aggregated approach is used for this category.   The level of 
aggregation in this essay is appropriate given that the interest is not about how untied aid affects specific 
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included in the system of equations to help identify the possible impact of untied aid on 
expenditures and revenues. Country-by-country estimates of the effect of untied aid on 
public expenditures and revenues are obtained from this system. The approach of 
obtaining country by country estimates is necessary to help answer the second question in 
this essay: does the overall extent of fungibility lessens as a consequence of recipient 
governments’ having greater leeway over their spending powers.  
One of the objectives of this essay is to assess whether the switch toward more 
untied aid has been effective in sustaining or increasing the expenditures in particular aid 
supported sectors. Therefore we will specify a model that contains a set of equations for 
expenditures and revenues and subject them to a budget constraint.  
The system of linear equations to be estimated takes the form of:  
ppetppetppetppetppeppet
OAIDAIDNSAIDSGDPPPE   43210 lnlnlnln
                  (2.1) 
where PPE (pro-poor expenditures) are selected sectors of government expenditures 
subject to sector-specific assistance. Specifically, these sectors include education, health, 
housing and water amenities. GDP is gross domestic product per capita, AIDSt is per 
capita aid directed at the pro-poor sectors, AIDNSt is aid that is not tied to any particular 
sector(s) but is free to be spent in any way desirable by the recipient government. OAIDt 
is aid directed at all other sectors not including the pro-poor sectors and Ɛ is the error 
term. 
othtothtothtothtothotht
OAIDAIDNSAIDSGDPOTH   43210 lnlnlnln               (2.2)                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                             
sectors but instead how effective is untied aid in increasing spending on expenditures thought to be apt for 
growth and development.  
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where OTH is aid to all other sectors including public order, energy, agriculture, 
transportation etc. OTH is also derived on a per capita basis. All the other variables are 
defined above. 
naetnaetnaenaet TAIDSGDPNAE   lnlnln 210                                                       (2.3)
 
 where NAE are sectors that do not receive aid disbursements. GDP is defined above and 
TAID is the sum of categorical and non-categorical/untied aid, that is 
 t AIDNSOAIDAIDS )(
           
The revenue equation is as follows: 
revtrevtrevrevt TAIDSGDPREV   lnlnln 210                                                        (2.4)
  
where REV is non-aid revenue.  All other terms are defined above.  
The government budget constraint is:  
ttjttttttt DEFOAIDAIDNSAIDSREVDSNAEOTHPPE  ,                     (2.5)                         
where DS is debt service and DEF
15
 is the size of the deficit(or surplus).  
The government budget constraint above infers that equations (2.1) – (2.4) are 
interdependent. Therefore, the approach to estimating this system of equations will be to 
omit one of those equations. The objective of this will be to remove any restriction(s) on 
the coefficient estimates. Additionally, the budget constraint also implies that the error 
terms in equations (2.1) – (2.4) are inter-related. This necessitates the use of the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method.  
                                                          
15
 DEF is endogenous, but is the omitted equation since equations (2.1) – (2.4), the budget identity plus the 
exogenous DS allow its calculation.  
 23 
 
Since the main hypothesis being tested is whether untied foreign assistance is 
more effective at increasing spending in the development expenditure categories, the 
coefficient of interest is the one on tAIDNS . From equation (2.1), a positive coefficient on
tAIDNS  
signifies that this very fungible money is being spent in sectors apt for growth 
and development. Also, as argued by the DAC-OECD, untied aid monies do not have the 
administrative burdens or the technical incompatibilities of donor and recipient 
technologies that accompanies tied aid. This further strengthens the argument that untied 
aid should then be more effective at achieving the targeted goals of growth and 
development for the least developed and developing economies among us. Also, in 
equation (2.1), a positive elasticity on tAIDS  02 de  indicates that an increase in this 
aid is used in the targeted sector, while a positive coefficient on tOAID  
( 04 de ) 
suggests a diversion from the targeted category of ‘other expenditure’ toward the pro-
poor expenditure category. To answer the question of whether the change in the 
composition of foreign assistance from tied to untied aid has brought the priorities of the 
international community closer to the national priorities of the recipient governments; I 
will estimate a model of fungibility. The specification for the fungibility model in this 
essay builds on previous specifications of this model by Pack and Pack [1990; 1993] and 
Pettersson (2007). Hence, to estimate the overall level of fungibility, a simulation of the 
effects of an increase in total foreign aid per capita, pro-rated to each categorical aid 
grouping in proportion to its mean value relative to total per capita aid was done. This 
simulation will calculate the change in each of the expenditure categories, as well as the 
non-aid supported expenditure sectors
16
 and own revenues, resulting from simultaneous 
                                                          
16
 These sectors are mainly defense, social security and welfare and ‘other’ expenditures.  
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changes in each of the categorical aid and the non-categorical aid value. The simulation 
should be interpreted as showing the effects of changes in aid, on average, given the 
average historical aid patterns in the panel of countries included in the dataset. The 
change in each aid supported expenditure category, for example, is captured in: 
t
t
t
ppet
t
t
ppet
t
t
ppet dOAID
OAID
PPE
dAIDNS
AIDNS
PPE
dAIDS
AIDS
PPE
PPEd 432

 
                      (2.6)                                                                                                                           
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AIDNS
OTH
dAIDS
AIDS
OTH
OTHd 432

 
                       (2.7)                                                                                                                 
            
Now, if on the one hand, the calculated change in a sector is smaller than the 
change in sectoral aid to that sector then aid is diverted away from that sector to other 
sectors. While on the other hand, if the change in sectoral aid applied to that sector is 
greater than the aid originally destined for that sector, then there is ‘diversion’ towards 
that sector. This change in the first instance is interpreted as the degree of fungibility. In 
the second instance, when total aid used in the sector is actually larger, we have a case of 
‘crowding in’.  
Data  
 
A dataset consisting of 57 countries for the period 1973-2006 is used for the 
estimation. Although I have a panel of 57 countries, the analysis is done on a country-by-
country basis with the countries selected for inclusion in the study based solely on the 
availability of data. I extend Pettersson’s (2007) dataset that already had information on 
tied aid to include information on untied aid. This dataset was chosen primarily for 
comparative purposes. Table A1 presents the summary statistics for the variables. A list 
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of all the countries in the sample is contained in Table A4. Data definition and the source 
of the data in this essay are listed in table A3. 
 All the aid data in this study comes from the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee’s online database and it includes data from both multilateral and bilateral 
donors. This database consists of two primary databases: the Development Assistance 
Committee’s (DAC) database and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) online database. 
It is important to highlight here that the DAC database only reports aggregate aid 
disbursed to the countries without any reference to the sectors supported by this aid. 
However, for this analysis, the amount of aid received by each public expenditure sector 
is needed. Therefore to compensate for this limitation of the DAC database, I had to 
utilize the CRS database. This database give the sectoral decomposition of total aid 
making it somewhat possible to use both databases together to derive proxies of the share 
of aid disbursed to the different expenditure sector.
17
 However, one drawback with using 
the CRS data to compute the sectoral shares of aid is that it only reports the amount of aid 
committed to the different expenditure category. The problem with using such a figure is 
that it might overstate the actual amount of aid disbursed to a sector since the amount of 
aid committed in a particular year may not actually be disbursed in that year. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, I make the assumptions that the amount of aid that is 
committed was actually disbursed and that it was disbursed in the year in which it was 
committed.
18
  
                                                          
17
 Burnside and Dollar (2000); Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) and Miquel-Florensa (2007) all use 
data on disbursement and commitment of aid from the OECD- DAC database. Ouattara (2006) and 
Mavrotas et al. (2007) use commitments on project aid and financial program aid and then convert these 
figures into disbursement form by applying their respective share in the commitment to the disbursement. 
Pack and Pack [1990; 1993]; Feyzioglu et al. (1998); Devarajan et al. (1999) use disbursement of 
concessionary loans by sector from the World Bank Database. 
18
 This is similar to what Pettersson (2007) assumed in his paper. 
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Also, from the CRS database it can be observed that some aid flows are not 
susceptible to allocation by sectors and can be reported as non-sector allocable aid. These 
types of non-sectoral aid are aggregated to form the untied component of aid. In this 
context, aid that is said to be untied just means it is not tied to any productive investment 
activity and can be thought of as a pure transfer.
19
 Further, untied aid can be devoted to 
debt reduction, as well as to consumption activities or other non-developmental projects. 
Examples of untied aid are aid for general purposes, general budget support, actions 
relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country.  
An important observation of the aid data (both tied and untied) is that it is 
recorded in current U.S dollars. Similar to Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Pettersson 
(2007) we convert both tied and untied aid into constant (1998) per capita dollars using 
population data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and subsequently deflate 
the series with the unit-value of imports price index from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). This provides measures of aid that is constant in terms of its purchasing 
power over a representative bundle of world imports.
20
 
 For the government expenditure data, we use data on expenditure by function for 
the consolidated central government accounts from the Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS) Database from IMF (2009). The expenditure data are reported in national currency 
and must be converted to US dollars for purposes of comparison. This is done using the 
‘DEC alternative conversion factor’ from the World Bank. To make both the expenditure 
and the aid data consistent, the resulting expenditure figures are converted to per capita 
US dollars after which they are deflated using the unit-value of imports price index.  
                                                          
19
 See Chatterjee et al. (2004) 
20
 See Burnside et al. (2000) and Pettersson (2007) for further discussion. 
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Results 
 
First, the results for the impact of the changes in the composition of international 
aid from tied to untied aid is summarized in figure 2. Specifically, figure 2 illustrates the 
distribution of the estimates of untied aid on the pro-poor expenditure sectors. The 
estimates are for 57 countries. The decision to switch to more untied aid came against the 
background of a plethora of evidence indicating a failure of tied aid to achieve targeted 
growth and development outcomes due either to problems of fungibility or to the above 
average prices charged for the products or services of the donor countries to which these 
monies are tied. So besides the old question of fungibility, we empirically analyze 
whether the switch to untied aid has been ‘more effective’ in sustaining or increasing 
expenditures in particular sectors that are thought to be more conducive to growth and 
development. 
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Figure 2.  The Effect of Untied Aid on PPE Sector, 1973-2006 
 
Figure 2 illustrates an approximately normal distribution of estimates, with an 
average estimate of 0.10 and a standard deviation of 0.27. The mean of this distribution is 
positive which suggests that a one percent increase in untied aid could possible lead to a 
0.1 percent increase in the expenditure category thought to be most likely to benefit the 
poor in society. The dispersion of these estimates around the mean can be considered 
slightly wide because of an outlier effect. For instance, in the case of Iran (See table 1), 
pro-poor expenditures increased by almost 1.4 percent for a one percent increase in 
untied aid. This estimate could possibly be explained by the increase in government 
revenues as a result of an increase in total aid; however, the revenue effect for this 
country is not significantly different from zero. Notwithstanding the outlier effect, 96 
percent of these country estimates are within two standard deviations of the mean, which 
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is in keeping with convention. It is important to emphasize here again that untied aid is 
really ‘unattached’ aid monies that can be spent according to the national priorities of the 
recipient government; therefore a positive average influence of untied aid would seem to 
suggest that these governments are indeed spending in areas that are conducive to the 
growth and development of their economies. 
Figure 3 illustrates the estimates of the impact of untied aid on ‘other expenditure’ 
category. Again, the distribution of these estimates appears to be approximately normal. 
However, the mean of this distribution is -0.018 suggesting that there is a more than 
proportionate reduction in this category of expenditures, on average. This estimate is 
somewhat surprising; however, the country of Iran (see table 1) has a more than 4 percent 
reduction in this expenditure category possibly contributing to the overall negative 
average effect. While Iran experiences a more than proportionate reduction in ‘other 
expenditures’, Colombia has about a 2.3 percent increase in this category of public 
expenditures. Additionally, the dispersion of the estimates around the mean is 0.676 
which is somewhat greater than in the case of the pro-poor expenditures effects. 
However, approximately 97 percent of these estimates are still within two standard 
deviations of the mean.  
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  Figure 3.  The Effect of Untied Aid on OTH Sector, 1973-2006 
 
      
While the mean and the dispersion of the estimates of untied aid on the two main 
expenditure categories are considered to be important indicators, the breakdown of this 
average on a country-by-country basis is also informative. For instance, in the case of 
Argentina, a one percent increase in untied aid increase expenditure in the pro-poor 
expenditure category by 0.15 percent, while expenditure in the ‘other expenditure’ 
category increased by about 0.10 percent. Apart from Argentina, countries such as 
Guatemala, Liberia, Malawi, Mali and Vanuatu all have positive and statistical 
significance coefficient estimates for untied aid. In the case Liberia and Mali, a one 
percent increase in untied aid results in an almost 0.5 percent increase in pro-poor 
expenditures.  Vanuatu and Guatemala also had greater than average increases in pro-
poor expenditure as a consequence of the inflow of untied aid with increases of 0.4 and 
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0.2 percent increase respectively. On the contrary, there are some countries for which 
untied aid negatively impacted pro-poor expenditures (see table 1). These countries 
include Bangladesh, Egypt, Mexico, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. While this 
effect seems quizzical, a possible explanation for such a result could be that the recipient 
governments also reduce their spending in this sector today in anticipation/expectation of 
more untied aid in the future.   
In the case of the ‘other expenditure’ category, a number of countries realized 
increases in this expenditure category as a result on the increase in untied aid. These 
countries include Argentina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Nepal, Solomon Islands, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. For instance, Burkina Faso and 
Solomon Islands spends as much as 0.8 percent of the 1 percent increase in untied aid in 
this category. 
In addition to including untied aid in these two broad expenditure categories, the 
influence of tied aid is also analyzed. The variable AID controls for the impact of aid that 
is directed to pro-poor expenditure category while OAID controls for aid that is not 
directed toward the pro-poor expenditure category but was nevertheless spent in that 
category. These interpretations will also be extended to the ‘other expenditure’ category.  
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the estimates of aid tied to the pro-poor 
expenditure category. The mean of this distribution is 0.013 indicating that of the 10 
percent increase in aid directed towards this category only 0.1 percent of it is actually 
spent in that category. This is indicative of extreme diversion of aid targeted at this 
expenditure category.  The dispersion of these estimates is 0.091 which indicates that 
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there is very little dispersion and approximately 93 percent of these estimates are within 2 
standard deviations of the mean. 
 
  Figure 4.  The Effect of Tied Aid on PPE Sector, 1973-2006 
 
 
A close look at individual country estimates (see table 1) for the impact of tied aid 
(AID) on the pro-poor expenditure category reveals that while some of the targeted aid is 
spent in the targeted sector, there is also evidence that some of this targeted aid is spent in 
other sectors. For instance, Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Egypt, Malawi, Mexico, 
Nepal, Tanzania and Vanuatu all have evidence of significant diversion of this aid away 
from the targeted sector. This diversion of aid funds could have some implications for the 
overall extent of fungibility for all countries in the sample as well as for that country.  
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The results for the fungibility estimates are presented in table 2. To calculate the 
extent of fungibility, however, I accounted for the effects of untied aid on the different 
expenditure categories. This slightly changes the methodology used in the previous 
studies by Pack and Pack [1990; 1993] and Pettersson (2007). The extent of fungibility is 
measured as the difference between pro-rated aid and the combined effect of categorical 
aid and non-categorical aid on both the ‘pro-poor’ and ‘other’ expenditure categories.  
That is, FUNGIBILITY = 1 – dPPE – dOTH. The main rationale for including untied aid 
in equations (2.6) and (2.7) is to arrive at a more accurate measure of fungibility that 
captures the budgetary impact of this type of aid. Fungibility estimates are calculated for 
the 57 countries over the period 1973 to 2006. The countries included in this analysis are 
chosen solely on the basis of data availability.  
 The distribution of the estimates of fungibility for the 57 countries over the period 
1973 to 2006 appears in figure 5. The mean of this distribution is calculated to be 0.72 
which suggests that there is a decrease in overall public spending. This result is 
comparable to previous findings in the literature. Much of the earlier literature also finds 
evidence of targeted funds not being spent in the targeted category. This evidence is often 
cited as the primary reason for the switch from tied to untied aid as the international 
financing community strongly believes that untied aid will be more helpful to recipient 
governments trying to focus on their national priorities. A closer look at the country-by-
country fungibility estimates in table 2 reveals that there are countries with estimates 
above and below this average. For instance, public expenditures in Argentina increased 
by almost eight dollars for every dollar of aid received. However, one could conclude that 
the model did not perform well for this country and therefore this estimate should be 
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interpreted with caution. It also can be observed that fungibility estimates for some 
countries fall outside the [0, 1] interval. However, similar to Pettersson (2007) we could 
censor some of those values that falls outside the interval to either zero or one depending 
on if they are less than zero or greater than one. According to the literature, fungibility is 
defined on the [0, 1] interval with 0 defined as non-fungibility; 1 defined as full-
fungibility; and any number between [0, 1] defined as partial fungibility. 7 of the 57 
countries have estimates that spans the [0, 1] interval (see table 2). This means that the 
FUNG estimates and the CI
21
 interval measures associated with each of these FUNG 
estimates dictates that 7 countries in the sample have both full fungibility and non-
fungibility at the same time. Therefore, one could conclude that the model performed 
fairly poorly for these 7 countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 CI is the confidence interval for FUNG using 90 percent for the cumulative t-distribution.  
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    Figure 5.  Fungibility Estimates for 57 Countries, 1973-2006 
 
  
Also, we can compare fungibility estimates for countries in my sample with 
existing estimates in the literature. Table A2 presents a comparison of these fungibility 
estimates. Similar to Pettersson and Pack and Pack, we find evidence of fungibility in 
Dominican Republic and Sri Lanka. This result is explained by the importance of foreign 
aid in public revenues. The argument made by Pack and Pack is that the smaller this 
share, the less likely the recipient’s expenditure will reflect the donors’ intentions.  
In sum, the results are mixed. The positive coefficient on untied aid suggests that 
on average, pro-poor expenditures increase with increases in untied aid. However, there 
are countries in the sample for which a negative and significant estimate is found 
suggesting a reduction in the pro-poor expenditure. Interestingly, the average impact of 
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untied aid on pro-poor expenditure is greater than the average impact of tied aid. This is 
suggestive of issues of diversion of aid funds away from its target. With the inclusion of 
untied aid in the fungibility model, we find that on average foreign aid stimulates total 
expenditure by less than dollar for dollar. This finding runs counter to that of Pettersson 
who finds that on average, one dollar of foreign aid stimulates more than a dollar increase 
in total expenditures. Overall, while there is evidence of fungibility, the extent of 
fungibility varies considerably among the countries in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 37 
 
    Table 1.  Regression Estimates of the Effect of Aid on the PPE and OTH Sectors 
Country Obs Pro-Poor Expenditure Other Expenditure 
  AID OAID AIDNS AID OAID AIDNS 
Argentina 23 -0.0484**  
(0.0234) 
-0.0081  
(0.0607) 
0.1521***   
(0.0498) 
-0.0155   
(0.0235) 
0.0992  
(0.0681) 
0.1030*   
(0.0535) 
Bangladesh 12 0.0888**   
(0.0321) 
-0.3270    
(0.2235) 
-0.2256*   
(0.1231) 
0.0067   
(0.0379) 
0.0812  
(0.2599) 
-0.2983**   
(0.1450) 
Belize 17 0.0033   
(0.0116) 
-0.0381   
(0.0312) 
-0.0283   
(0.0576) 
-0.0083    
(0.0144) 
-0.0690*    
(0.0410) 
-0.0594   
(0.0656) 
Bhutan 22 -0.0267   
(0.0299) 
-0.0820   
(0.0585) 
0.0131   
(0.0113) 
-0.0285    
(0.0476) 
0.0400   
(0.0927) 
0.0122   
(0.0179) 
Bolivia 20 -0.1692***   
(0.0616) 
0.0147  
(0.0972) 
-0.1907   
(0.1506) 
0.2040**   
(0.0802) 
0.1540   
(0.1379) 
0.2492  
(0.1897) 
Botswana 23 -0.0277   
(0.0622) 
0.01711   
(0.0638) 
0.0810   
(0.0779) 
-0.0009   
(0.0380) 
0.0553   
(0.0389) 
0.0380   
(0.0441) 
Brazil 11 0.0741***   
(0.0215) 
0.3184***    
(0.0714) 
0.0139  
(0.1815) 
-0.0321    
(0.0232) 
0.1760**   
(0.0772) 
-0.1101   
(0.1442) 
Burkina 
Faso 
15 -0.0356   
(0.0232) 
-0.0280   
(0.1127) 
0.2610   
(0.1992) 
-0.0119    
(0.0267) 
-0.3626***    
(0.1296) 
0.7831***   
(0.2343) 
Burundi 8 0.0602***   
(0.0155) 
-0.0289   
(0.0236) 
0.0720   
(0.0542) 
0.0477    
(0.0464) 
0.0677**   
(0.0306) 
0.3402***   
(0.1033) 
Cameroon 23 -0.0930**   
(0.0369) 
-0.0693    
(0.1021) 
0.0298   
(0.0291) 
-0.0342   
(0.0370) 
0.2781***   
(0.1024) 
-0.0101   
(0.0280) 
Chile 19 0.0082    
(0.0082) 
-0.0042   
(0.0072) 
0.0571   
(0.0361) 
0.0104   
(0.0204) 
0.0263   
(0.0180) 
0.0695   
(0.0601) 
China 9 0.2241***   
(0.0548) 
-0.3284***   
(0.0829) 
-0.1969   
(0.1179) 
0.1765**   
(0.0780) 
-0.1521    
(0.1181) 
-0.2667   
(0.1561) 
Colombia 9 -0.1030*   
(0.0532) 
-0.0355   
(0.1020) 
0.1305   
(0.4320) 
-0.1283*     
(0.0702) 
-0.1411   
(0.1346) 
2.2322***   
(0.5791) 
Costa Rica 14 -0.0190   
(0.0157) 
-0.0166   
(0.06670) 
0.1000   
(0.0774) 
0.0366**   
(0.0173) 
-0.0268   
(0.0896) 
0.1749**   
(0.0758) 
Dominican 
Republic 
12 0.0268   
(0.0524) 
-0.0470   
(0.1330) 
-0.0271    
(0.05979) 
-0.0167   
(0.0203) 
-0.1692**    
(0.0631) 
-0.0676**   
(0.0279) 
Egypt 21 -0.0817***   
(0.0242) 
0.1490***   
(0.0550) 
-0.1794*   
(0.0935) 
-0.0014   
(0.0339) 
0.2239***   
(0.0763) 
-0.0686   
(0.1307) 
El Salvador 29 -0.0044   
(0.0307) 
0.1130**   
(0.0542) 
-0.0530   
(0.1303) 
-0.0150   
(0.0257) 
0.0261  
(0.0459) 
-0.0188   
(0.1593) 
Ethiopia 26 0.0294   
(0.0177) 
0.0949**   
(0.0362) 
-0.0805   
(0.1037) 
-0.0049   
(0.0203) 
0.0875**   
(0.0416) 
-0.1086   
(0.1225) 
Fiji 19 0.0097    
(0.0168) 
0.0286   
(0.0266) 
-0.1299   
(0.0996) 
0.0411   
(0.0348) 
0.0179   
(0.0550) 
0.0896    
(0.2059) 
Ghana 20 0.0379*   
(0.0211) 
0.0635**   
(0.0267) 
0.0881   
(0.1121) 
0.0013   
(0.0303) 
-0.0134    
(0.0384) 
0.0142   
(0.1538) 
Guatemala 13 0.0506   
(0.0836) 
-0.0821   
(0.1332) 
0.2062***   
(0.0862) 
-0.2427*   
(0.1284) 
0.6002***   
(0.1973) 
0.3056**   
(0.1405) 
India 27 0.0216 
(0.0159) 
-0.0045   
(0.0343) 
0.0100   
(0.0145) 
0.0237*   
(0.0126) 
-0.0477*   
(0.0273) 
0.0143   
(0.0107) 
Indonesia 26 -0.0726    
(0.0502) 
-0.1781   
(0.1126) 
0.1520   
(0.0962) 
0.1316**   
(0.0531) 
0.1026   
(0.1192) 
0.1858*   
(0.1078) 
Iran 12 0.0459*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0225*** 
(0.0061) 
1.3642** 
(0.4509) 
0.0526** 
(0.0252) 
-0.2021*** 
(0.0509) 
-4.1156** 
(1.3267) 
Jordan 32 0.0379*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0705** 
(0.0276) 
-0.0796* 
(0.0453) 
0.0524 
(0.0368) 
0.0285 
(0.0182) 
-0.0326 
(0.0627) 
Kenya 21 0.0218 
(0.0160) 
0.0502 
(0.0338) 
-0.0193 
(0.0670) 
0.0632** 
(0.0302) 
0.2358*** 
(0.0639) 
0.0194 
(0.1010) 
  Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. All  
  variables are in logs; therefore coefficients must be interpreted as elasticities.  Time dummies are also included in       
  each equation.     The variable of interest, AIDNS (untied aid) is calculated by summing general budget support,     
  actions relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country and general purpose aid.  
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    Table 1 cont’d.  Regression Estimates of the Effect of Aid on the PPE and OTH Sectors 
Liberia 11 0.0547** 
(0.0215) 
0.0451 
(0.0449) 
0.4590*** 
(0.1022) 
0.1325*** 
(0.0367) 
0.0580 
(0.0818) 
-0.0113 
(0.1912) 
Madagascar 11 0.0060   
(0.0409) 
-0.0051   
(0.1119) 
-0.0003   
(0.0208) 
0.0364   
(0.0391) 
0.1085   
(0.1068) 
-0.0337   
(0.0235) 
Malawi 13 -0.0421**   
(0.0188) 
0.0389   
(0.0403) 
0.1848**   
(0.0892) 
-0.0009    
(0.0162) 
0.1033***   
(0.0351) 
0.1412   
(0.1025) 
Maldives 19 0.1158*   
(0.0599) 
0.1214**   
(0.0550) 
0.1315   
(0.0952) 
0.0227    
(0.0672) 
0.0055   
(0.0653) 
0.1264  
(0.1166) 
Mali 12 -0.0401    
(0.0391) 
0.1216    
(0.1528) 
0.4895*   
(0.2778) 
-0.0319   
(0.1038) 
-0.1801   
(0.4026) 
-0.0978   
(0.7410) 
Mauritius 27 -0.0004   
(0.0073) 
-0.0663*   
(0.0333) 
0.0347  
(0.0371) 
0.0094    
(0.0090) 
0.0188   
(0.0411) 
0.0308   
(0.0433) 
Mexico 10 -0.0544***   
(0.0138) 
0.0391***   
(0.0087) 
-0.3722***   
(0.1214) 
0.0084   
(0.0104) 
-0.0475***   
(0.0065) 
-0.798***   
(0.1291) 
Mongolia 15 0.0328   
(0.0403) 
0.6140**   
(0.2202) 
0.0020  
(0.0790) 
-0.0263   
(0.0226) 
0.2226*   
(0.1238) 
-0.0166   
(0.0444) 
Morocco 19 -0.0160   
(0.0130) 
0.0098   
(0.0223) 
-0.0115   
(0.0079) 
0.0125   
(0.0248) 
-0.0353   
(0.0389) 
-0.0006   
(0.0155) 
Myanmar 
(Burma) 
12 -0.0067   
(0.0138) 
0.0055   
(0.0618) 
-0.0097   
(0.0730) 
-0.0067    
(0.0187) 
-0.0509   
(0.0838) 
-0.0369   
(0.1088) 
Nepal 33 -0.0594*   
(0.0354) 
-0.0971   
(0.1007) 
0.2861   
(0.1839) 
-0.0033   
(0.0308) 
-0.1796**   
(0.0877) 
0.3002*   
(0.1679) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
12 -0.0280   
(0.0437) 
0.0009   
(0.0395) 
-0.0110   
(0.2338) 
-0.0021   
(0.0395) 
-0.0088    
(0.0367) 
-0.0507     
(0.2045) 
Paraguay   20 -0.0030   
(0.0112) 
0.0043   
(0.0408) 
-0.0619   
(0.0531) 
-0.0101   
(0.01205) 
-0.0673  
(0.0439) 
-0.0512   
(0.0532) 
Philippines 33 0.0237   
(0.0189) 
0.0732   
(0.0452) 
0.0072   
(0.0598) 
0.0034   
(0.0264) 
-0.0172   
(0.0633) 
-0.2026**   
(0.0940) 
Solomon 
Islands 
12 0.0049   
(0.0363) 
0.0921   
(0.0702) 
-0.1957   
(0.1674) 
0.0185   
(0.0343) 
-0.0586   
(0.0662) 
0.7425***   
(0.1580) 
Sri Lanka 24 -0.0096   
(0.0162) 
-0.0917   
(0.0696) 
-0.0638   
(0.0760) 
-0.0204   
(0.0220) 
0.0545   
(0.0948) 
0.0057   
(0.1151) 
St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
15 0.0016   
(0.0056) 
0.0190***   
(0.0066) 
-0.0059   
(0.0123) 
0.0312***   
(0.0053) 
0.0577***   
(0.0061) 
-0.114***   
(0.0116) 
Swaziland 16 0.0279    
(0.0206) 
-0.0036   
(0.0401) 
-0.0342   
(0.0618) 
-0.078***    
(0.0171) 
0.2017***   
(0.0333) 
0.0093   
(0.0516) 
Syria 8 -0.0061   
(0.0039) 
-0.1336***   
(0.0151) 
-0.1299**   
(0.0500) 
0.0108  
(0.0099) 
-0.0015   
(0.03709) 
-0.1799   
(0.1249) 
Tanzania 8 -0.0420***   
(0.0136) 
-0.0281   
(0.0328) 
0.1869   
(0.1063) 
-0.086***   
(0.0130) 
0.0980***   
(0.0314) 
-0.0794   
(0.1095) 
Thailand 30 0.0044   
(0.0075) 
-0.0293   
(0.0364) 
-0.02452   
(0.0383) 
0.0083   
(0.0239) 
0.0288    
(0.1153) 
0.0161   
(0.1195) 
Tonga 11 0.0086   
(0.0198) 
-0.0910   
(0.1697) 
-0.3623   
(0.2375) 
0.0046   
(0.0162) 
-0.1419   
(0.1341) 
-0.3066   
(0.1949) 
Tunisia 27 0.01125   
(0.0096) 
-0.0434   
(0.0319) 
-0.0389**   
(0.0173) 
-0.0101   
(0.0081) 
0.1136***   
(0.0274) 
0.0388**   
(0.0148) 
Turkey 20 -0.0076   
(0.0088) 
-0.0059   
(0.0204) 
-0.0099    
(0.0658) 
-0.0071   
(0.0118) 
0.1271***   
(0.0273) 
0.2598***   
(0.0625) 
Uganda 8 0.4458***   
(0.1364) 
-0.5468   
(0.3713) 
-0.4779***   
(0.1285) 
0.5742***   
(0.1163) 
-0.6893*   
(0.3213) 
-0.513***   
(0.1096) 
Uruguay 22 -0.0100   
0.0070 
0.0229*   
(0.0122) 
0.0050   
(0.0104) 
0.0052   
(0.0111) 
0.0058   
(0.0191) 
0.0162   
(0.0165) 
Vanuatu 9 -0.1346***   
(0.0214) 
-0.0199   
(0.0398) 
0.3843**   
(0.1737) 
0.0881***   
(0.0213) 
-0.0548   
(0.0399) 
-0.611***    
(0.1728) 
Viet Nam 12 0.1574*   
(0.0745) 
-0.3452***   
(0.0776) 
0.0640   
(0.0358) 
0.0842   
(0.0922) 
-0.3386***   
(0.0967) 
0.0799  
(0.0509) 
  Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. All  
  variables are in logs; therefore coefficients must be interpreted as elasticities.  Time dummies are also included in         
  each equation. The variable of interest, AIDNS (untied aid) is calculated by summing general budget support,  
  actions relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country and general purpose aid. 
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    Table 1 cont’d.   Regression Estimates of the Effect of Aid on the PPE and OTH Sectors 
Yemen 7 0.2324***   
(0.0352) 
0.3094***   
(0.0345) 
0.0757     
(0.0428) 
0.0960   
(0.0745) 
0.4827***   
(0.0672) 
0.5210***   
(0.1001) 
Zambia 23 0.0216   
(0.0375) 
0.0839   
(0.0534) 
0.1203   
(0.1822) 
-0.0319   
(0.0897) 
0.3167**   
(0.1269) 
0.1353   
(0.4287) 
Zimbabwe 9 0.0084   
(0.0478) 
0.0324    
(0.0464) 
-0.1877**   
(0.0837) 
0.1989**   
(0.0897) 
0.1733*   
(0.0878) 
-0.0583   
(0.1225) 
   Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. All    
   variables are in logs; therefore coefficients must be interpreted as elasticities. Time dummies are also included in     
   each equation. The variable of interest, AIDNS (untied aid) is calculated by summing general budget support,  
   actions relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country and general purpose aid.  
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  Table 2.   Fungibility Estimates for the 57 countries over the period, 1973-2006   
Country Byear Eyear DPPE DOTH FUNG  CI   Span[0,1] 
Argentina 1983 2006 1.738 7.542 -7.964 8.471                  
Bangladesh 1974 1985 -0.107 -0.205 1.315 0.509  
Belize 1978 1994 -0.081 -0.292 1.361 0.324  
Bhutan 1983 2006 -0.063 -0.012 1.01 0.496  
Bolivia 1987 2006 -0.22 0.32 0.703 0.364  
Botswana 1974 1996 0.064 0.092 0.85 0.335  
Brazil 1981 1991 0.785 0.074 0.134 1.333     Yes 
Burkina Faso 1976 1990 0.004 0.012 0.984 0.021  
Burundi 1992 1999 0.005 0.062 0.939 0.025  
Cameroon 1977 1999 -0.194 -0.037 0.707 1.002 Yes 
Chile 1988 2006 0.189 0.175 0.596 0.372  
China 1991 1999 -0.003 -0.365 1.094 0.246  
Colombia 1991 1999 0.001 0.789 0.26 0.18  
Costa Rica 1982 1995 0.9 1.13 -1.042 2.84 Yes 
Dom. Republic 1981 1992 -0.07 -0.948 2.129 1.127  
Egypt 1977 1997 -0.031 0.179 0.93 0.408  
El Salvador 1978 2006 -0.004 0.006 0.99 0.117  
Ethiopia 1974 1999 0.001 0.001 0.999 0.007  
Fiji 1978 1996 -0.13 0.339 0.823 0.664  
Ghana 1974 1993 0.013 0.001 0.985 0.036  
Guatemala 1982 1994 0.234 1.606 -1.215 1.961  
India 1975 2001 -0.003 0.358 1.063 0.442  
Indonesia 1974 1999 -0.008 0.077 0.941 0.058  
Iran 1994 2006 1.128 -4.077 3.916 2.39  
Jordan 1975 2006 -0.008 0.045 1.004 0.277  
Kenya 1978 1998 0.002 0.018 0.979 0.012  
Liberia 1977 1987 0.318 0.523 0.472 0.723 Yes 
Madagascar 1989 1999 0.001 0.014 0.965 0.031  
Malawi 1976 1988 0.016 0.08 0.902 0.069  
Maldives 1988 2006 0.591 0.327 0.074 0.658  
Mali 1977 1988 0.142 -0.127 0.985 0.953  
Mauritius 1980 2006 -0.114 0.118 0.968 0.192  
Mexico 1990 1999 -0.508 -0.766 2.194 0.408  
Mongolia 1993 2006 0.042 0.059 0.895 0.061  
Morocco 1981 1999 -0.061 -0.117 1.187 0.619  
Myanmar (Burma) 1977 1988 0.001 -0.018 1.015 0.04  
Nepal 1974 2006 0.004 0.008 0.99 0.017  
Papua New Guinea 1986 1999 -0.059 -0.186 1.252 1.023  
Paraguay 1974 1993 -0.021 -0.171 1.156 0.311  
Philippines 1974 2006 0.069 -0.192 1.155 0.314  
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  Table 2 cont’d.   Fungibility Estimates for the 57 countries over the period, 1973-2006   
Country  Byear Eyear  DPPE DOTH FUNG  CI      Span[0,1] 
Solomon Islands 1977 1988 -0.035 0.41 0.613 0.09  
Sri Lanka 1974 1997 -0.006 0.019 1.006 0.037  
St.Vin. & Gren. 1992 2006 0.07 -0.15 1.215 0.186  
Swaziland 1974 1989 -0.018 0.356 0.746 0.326  
Syria 1992 1999 -0.156 -0.494 1.662 0.74  
Tanzania 1974 1981 0.002 -0.009 1.001 0.016  
Thailand 1977 2006 -0.021 0.026 0.99 0.227  
Tonga 1981 1991 -0.255 -0.795 2.05 1.114  
Tunisia 1974 2000 -0.382 0.811 0.415 0.663 Yes 
Turkey 1987 2006 -0.047 0.926 0.043 0.412  
Uganda 1979 1986 -0.653 -0.481 2.677 1.375  
Uruguay 1985 2006 -0.026 0.192 0.526 0.629 Yes 
Vanuatu 1982 1990 0.132 -0.614 1.473 0.388  
Viet Nam 1995 2006 0.009 -0.122 1.117 0.112  
Yemen 1993 1999 1.039 3.091 -3.085 0.914  
Zambia 1974 1996 0.064 0.414 0.555 0.756 Yes 
Zimbabwe 1981 1989 -0.13 0.142 0.788 0.454  
  Notes: BYEAR is defined as the first year for which a value is available for a country; EYEAR is the last year for      
  which a value is available for a country; FUNG is the definition for fungibility. This is already defined above and CI    
  is the confidence interval. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The composition of foreign aid has been changing overtime; therefore, any 
evaluation of its impact on public expenditure and/or tax revenues should take into 
account not only tied aid but also untied aid. The move to switch from tied to untied aid 
is precipitated by the less than impressive growth and development outcomes associated 
with tied aid.  Tying aid to the products or services of the donor country eliminates as 
much as thirty (30) percent of the value of aid because of the greater than average price 
that must be paid for these products. In addition to this, the problem of fungibility 
reduces the effectiveness of tied aid because it may be directed at sectors that promote the 
strategic/special interests of the donors’ without catering to the national priorities of the 
recipient countries. The international financing community strongly advocated for the use 
of untied aid to help achieve the growth and development outcomes that were not realized 
with the use of tied foreign aid. They argue that untied aid would be the better financing 
option since it would allow recipient countries to focus on their national priorities instead 
of the special enthusiasms of the donor countries. The empirical analysis finds that on 
average, untied aid did indeed increase pro-poor expenditure by 0.1 percent, and 
interestingly this increase in public spending is greater than when there is an equal 
increase in tied aid. The analysis actually reveals that pro-poor expenditures increased by 
only 0.013 percent for a one percent increases in tied aid. Therefore, one could conclude 
that untied aid is relatively more effective than tied aid in achieving growth and 
development targets.  The country-by-country analysis also reveals that for some of the 
countries in the sample, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of untied aid 
on pro-poor expenditures. 
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In addition to the question of the changing composition of foreign aid, there is 
also the question of how does this shift from tied to untied aid affect the overall extent of 
fungibility of foreign aid. Empirical evidence in previous literature strongly suggests the 
presence of fungibility of foreign aid and that this fungibility is partially due to the large 
fraction of foreign aid that is tied to specify projects or expenditures which may not 
coincide with the immediate needs of the recipient governments. As such these 
governments find ways to either reduce their own spending in the targeted sector(s) or 
continue to allocate the same amount to the targeted activity but now spend only a 
fraction of the dollar amount received from the donors to be spent in the targeted sector.  
 The evidence in this essay reveals that on average foreign aid is fungible. Similar 
results are also found in a number of other studies. Even though this study accounts for 
untied aid in the fungibility equation (no other studies have done this) there is still 
evidence of fungibility and the overall extent of fungibility seems relatively high. The 
average estimate is 0.72 suggesting that for every one dollar of total aid received; only 
$0.28 is spent on public expenditures. However, this result should be interpreted with 
caution since some of the countries in my sample had very large (or very small) 
fungibility estimates which could be impacting the average. Despite these concerns, 
however, it is obvious that fungibility continues to be an issue for tied aid. The 
effectiveness of foreign aid is generally challenged on the grounds that donors’ interest 
and recipients need do not coincide and the evidence found in this paper seems to be in 
support of this. Hence, one could conclude that though the switch to untied aid increases 
expenditures in the sectors thought to be apt for growth and development, fungibility 
continues to affect the effectiveness of tied even with the accounting for untied aid.        
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ESSAY 2 
 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT FORGIVENESS AND TAX EFFORT: A PANEL 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the most important development issues facing the international community 
for several decades now has been the low levels of public expenditures in infrastructure 
and social services in developing countries.
22
 Low levels of public spending may have 
been responsible for placing many of these countries in a poverty trap. Breaking out of 
this trap requires, among others, a combination of international aid in the form of 
technical assistance with low cost loans and increased sustained tax effort by the 
developing countries themselves. However, international aid, especially when it is 
accompanied with debt forgiveness, can interact with domestic tax effort in some 
perverse ways, which can compromise the sustainability of these fundamental 
development goals. And even though, there has been considerable interest in the 
economic literature on the separate topics of tax effort in developing countries,
23
 and 
international assistance and debt forgiveness,
24
 the interaction between these two issues 
has not yet been explored in the literature. 
    The issue of debt forgiveness has generated much debate in both the academic and 
policy literatures, and rightly so. For example, under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) Initiative which started in 1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
                                                          
22
 See World Development Reports [1998/1999; 2000/2001; 2004] 
23
 See Teera (2004); Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004); Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 
(2008)  
24
 See Neumayer (2002);  Ndikumana (2004); Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) 
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(MDRI) started in late 2005, assistance amounted to $117 billion in nominal terms over 
the last decade (see figure B1).
25
 In 2007, this represented about one half of the GDP of 
these countries.  In particular, at the June 1999 Cologne summit, the G-7 decided to  
write off approximately $100 billion of developing countries sovereign debt. The 
decision to write-off these debts as opposed to providing a temporary solution through 
debt rescheduling was seen as necessary to improve the supply of resources in these 
countries and to enhance investments, economic growth and development.
26
 The Jubilee 
2000 Campaign
27
 is another initiative that called for the cancellation of third world debt. 
This initiative was more extensive than the HIPC initiative in that the amount earmarked 
for debt forgiveness ranged between $200 and $300 billion and it covered 52 countries 
(compared with 41 under HIPC). However, with the realization that countries still had 
huge debt stocks, a 100 percent forgiveness of loans to HIPC graduates was granted at the 
June 2005 G-8 summit. These more generous forgiveness terms sought to ease the debt 
burden of developing countries and encourage physical capital accumulation which 
would eventually lead to higher incomes and a greater share of national income in 
government coffers.   
However, the chain of events linking debt forgiveness to higher incomes and 
finally to higher tax revenues is not as straightforward as one may think because there is 
an inherent moral hazard problem associated with the provision of debt forgiveness. The 
primary problem is that debt forgiveness has the potential to lower financial discipline 
because recipient governments may act in future years on the expectation that new 
                                                          
25
 See www.worldbank/org/ 
26
 See table B1 in Appendix B for a discussion of the different initiatives and terms granted by Paris Club 
creditors. 
27
 Jubilee 2000 campaign was started in the early 1990s in over 40 countries, with the main objective being 
the cancellation of third world debt by the year 2000.   
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bailouts will be received. Therefore, the act of providing debt forgiveness today can 
cause countries to come to expect more debt forgiveness in the future ultimately leading 
to a ‘softening’ of their budget constraint. One possible outcome of a soft budget 
constraint is that developing countries may not have an incentive to bolster their own tax 
effort and therefore make development a sustainable goal.  
In this paper we study whether the expectation of debt forgiveness actually acts to 
soften developing countries’ budget constraints by investigating in particular how debt 
forgiveness, after controlling for other economic and institutional variables, actually 
affects tax effort.  
Tax effort – defined in this paper as the tax ratio or tax revenues as a share of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - reveals a government preference for taxing or not its 
existing tax base.
28
 In general, tax effort in developing countries is considerably lower 
than in developed countries.
29
 Low tax effort in turn leads developing countries to face 
difficulties, sometimes extreme, to keep up with their debt service payments and all other 
budgetary demands.  
Beyond investigating the impact of debt forgiveness on tax effort, one must ask 
whether a reverse causation is actually in place; that is, whether countries with lower tax 
ratios were provided with more debt forgiveness. This is important from an empirical 
estimation viewpoint to allow for the endogeneity of tax effort and debt forgiveness, but 
                                                          
28
 See Roy Bahl  (1971); Teera (2004); Gupta et al (2003), Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004); 
Bird et al (2008). Note that in some of this literature a distinction is made between the tax ratio (tax 
revenues to GDP) and tax effort defined as the proportion of potential revenues that are actually collected, 
and where potential revenues are defined as those obtained by multiplying the actual tax bases (or their 
proxies) by average effective rate for the countries in a particular group category. See, for example, (Bird et 
al (2008). 
29
 The average tax revenues found in many developing countries is around 10-15 percent which is relatively 
low when compared to say OECD countries with tax collections around 40 percent (see, e.g., Kaldor (1963) 
and Tanzi and Zee (2000:303)). Countries such as Niger and Guatemala all have below average tax 
revenues and are struggling to increase this above 11 percent. 
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also important from a policy viewpoint. Examining this issue will allow us to see if on 
the one hand the international financial community is saying one thing but in reality 
practicing something very different. In particular, the Paris club creditors have been 
urging developing countries (HIPC) to improve their revenue collections above 15 
percent of GDP to qualify for assistance under the HIPC initiative, however, those 
countries that have lower tax efforts are treated preferentially in term of debt forgiveness 
investigate and differently in general from non-HIPCs in that they received larger debt 
reductions than any other country group.
30 
 
One of the underlying reasons given in the literature for the low tax effort 
observed is the lack of political will to tap into existing ‘taxable capacity” with existing 
tax structures and, in general, to increase taxes. Other factors such as weak  
administrative capacity, the level of income inequality as measured by the gini 
coefficient, high levels of corruption, less developed manufacturing sector—traditionally 
easier to tax—and predominance of agricultural sector—traditionally harder to tax have 
been identified.
31
 However, as was put by Kaldor (1963) many decades ago, even the 
poorest of countries have sufficient ‘capacity’ both in economic and administrative terms 
to tax more than they do.
32
 Therefore, it is important to ask what may actually be behind 
the overall reluctance to tax. The lack of political will explanation is of little use from a 
policy perspective and it actually may mask other reasons which can be addressed with 
the right policies. In this paper we explore to what extent the otherwise well-intentioned 
actions of the international financial community can be an important cause of the low tax 
                                                          
30
 See www.clubdeparis.org/ 
31
 See, for example, Bird et al. (1971); Gupta (2003); Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004); Bird 
et al.  (2008); Alonso et al. (2011) 
32
 See Kaldor (1963) 
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effort observed among developing countries. In order to understand how significant debt 
forgiveness may be in influencing tax effort, it will be necessary to take into 
consideration the potential endogeneity of debt forgiveness itself. There is a strong 
indication that our variable of interest is endogenous because among the criteria used by 
the international financial community to include a country in the list of those deserving 
forgiveness is low level of revenues generated by a country, which are likely to show up 
in high deficits, low levels of spending on infrastructure and social services, and so on.  
The challenge ahead is to be able to find appropriate instruments for debt 
forgiveness in our regression analysis to successfully address the endogeneity issue. The 
literature on debt forgiveness/debt relief does not identify any unique instrument(s) for 
this variable.
33
 Therefore, we start with a 2SLS approach, first estimating an equation of 
debt forgiveness controlling for factors that may affect the need or merit of a particular 
country for debt forgiveness, plus the political-strategic relationship between donor 
countries and the developing country, and the overall governance of the developing 
country. However, there is a caveat about using this methodology since it does not 
capture potential dynamism that possibly exists in the relationship we are attempting to 
study. Therefore, to take into consideration the possibility of dynamism in this 
relationship, we also use the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. 
System GMM however, is not without its own limitations. The model we are estimating 
has a proportional left-hand side variable which system GMM cannot adequately address. 
Therefore, we also use quasi-maximum likelihood estimation to account for the fractional 
response variable in our model.  
                                                          
33
 See for example, Neumayer (2002); Ndikumana (2004); Freytag  et al. (2009)  
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The model is estimated using a panel data set of 66 countries over the period 
1989-2006.  To exploit the panel nature of the data we control for fixed country and year 
effects in all three estimation methods. The principal finding of the paper is that debt 
forgiveness actually triggers a decline in tax ratios. In other words, debt forgiveness 
would seem to act as a substitute for politically costly increased tax revenues.  
As in the previous literature we also find that structural factors such as per capita 
GDP, manufacture value added in GDP, services value added in GDP, and trade openness 
are strong determinants of tax ratios.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a review of the 
literature. Section three presents the theoretical framework. The empirical model and a 
discussion of the data follow in Sections four and five respectively. Estimation results are 
discussed in Sections six. The paper concludes in section seven with some policy 
implications.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Tax revenues are essential for providing public goods and services in a 
sustainable manner. According to Kaldor (1963), the key indicator of whether a country 
can transition from a position of aid-dependency to one of economic self-sufficiency 
depends on if a state learns how to tax, thereby halting the vicious cycle of aid reliance. 
Aid dependency has long been recognized for its deleterious effects on tax revenues. 
According to Bauer (1972), foreign aid can create perverse incentives and lead states’ to 
collect less revenues. Further, he argues that large increases in aid flows can create 
dysfunctional state institutions and as such he expresses much skepticism about the 
desirability of such aid. Azam et al. (1999) present similar arguments, claiming that if a 
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country can cut its ‘aid umbilical cord’ and engage in learning-by-doing in the public 
sector, the overall level of tax revenues may be positively impacted. 
The potential effects of aid dependency were not studied in the traditional tax 
effort literature. This literature considered a limited set of variables as possible 
determinants of tax effort (Lotz and Morrs, 1967; Bahl 1971; Chelliah 1971; Chelliah et 
al 1975; Tanzi, 1981). These variables include GDP per capita, the degree of openness of 
the economy, the non-agricultural share of GDP, and in some cases population growth 
(Tanzi, 1992; Leuthold, 1991). However, there were some exceptions. In particular, 
Leuthold (1991) views foreign aid as non-earned source of revenue. And, consequently, a 
government that receives significant amounts of aid is thought to have less incentive to 
tax and improve its tax administration.  
A number of studies have investigated the impact of foreign aid on tax effort, 
although none of these studies have investigated the issue of debt forgiveness. However, 
the evidence provided thus far is inconclusive. Pack and Pack (1990) studied the impact 
of foreign aid on both expenditures and revenues in Indonesia.  This study uses highly 
disaggregated time series data on expenditure and foreign aid. They found that foreign 
aid stimulates an approximately equivalent change in expenditures with half the increase 
being financed by an increase in the revenues raised by Indonesia from its own sources. 
Therefore, tax effort in Indonesia increases as a result of foreign aid. It is important to 
note that the studies of foreign aid on tax effort have evolved over the last couple of 
years. With the availability of data, the more recent studies use both cross-section and 
times series data to study the impact of foreign aid on tax efforts. Ghura (1998) examines 
the effect of the conventional tax effort variables and foreign aid in a panel of 39 sub-
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Saharan African countries for the period 1985-1996. Foreign aid is significant and 
negatively correlated with tax shares of GDP. Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) use a 
panel of 38 developing countries to study the relationship between foreign aid and public 
spending in recipient countries. They show that an increase of $1.00 in foreign aid leads 
to an increase of $0.33 in total government spending with the remainder being used for 
tax relief. Brautigam (2008) categorized African countries according to their aid 
dependency ratio – the share of aid in GDP – and found that 71 percent of these countries 
had tax effort lower than 10 percent. Also, Remmer (2004) using a panel of middle and 
lower-income countries for the period 1970-1999 provides evidence of depressing effects 
of aid on domestic revenue mobilization.  
While these studies find negative and significant effects of aid on tax effort, there 
are some studies that find zero-effect. Leuthold (1991) uses a panel of 8 African countries 
for the period 1973-1981 and she finds a negative effect of aid on tax revenues, however, 
the estimate was insignificant. Teera and Hudson (2004) use data for 116 developed and 
developing countries for 1975-1998, also find a zero effect of aid on tax effort. Franco-
Rodriguez (2000) provides evidence to suggest that foreign aid appears to induce tax 
efforts with a positive effect on recurrent revenue. Mavrotas (2002) using time-series data 
on India and Kenya over the time period 1970-1990 and 1970-1992 respectively provides 
empirical estimates of the impact of aid on tax efforts in these countries. He finds that the 
presence of aid does not necessarily increase tax effort in India but that it does in Kenya. 
Also more recently, several studies have taken the composition of aid into account 
when examining its impact on tax effort. Brun et al. (2007) examine the revenue effects 
of aid, by examining whether different approaches to transferring aid (eg. grants and 
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loans) could help to limit or offset the potentially negative effects of aid on revenue 
raising. They found an overall positive effect of aid, both loans and grants, on tax efforts 
in developing countries. A similar result was found by Otim (2004). In that study Otim 
finds that in a pooled sample of three South Asian economies, grants are more likely to 
leak into consumption than loans. Therefore, he suggests that domestic investment 
stimulation can be achieved via loans extended to developing countries rather than grants, 
and he also finds that both grants and loans increase tax efforts. Gupta et al. (2003) find a 
somewhat different set of result for the impact of grants and loans on tax revenues. They 
use a panel of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2002 and focus on the 
revenue response of foreign aid inflows by separating total net aid into grants and loans 
to test if the impact of grants on domestic revenue is different from that of concessional 
loans. They report results of possible substitutability of tax revenue with grant monies 
since grants are generally considered to be free money that need not be repaid. On the 
other hand, loans come at a price since they must be repaid. Therefore at the very 
minimum governments must maintain at least the current levels of tax revenue according 
to Brautigam (2008). Khan and Hoshino (1992) also provide some empirical evidence 
that grants reduce tax effort while loans increase it. This result was found in a sample of 
five South and Southeast Asian countries over the period 1955-1976. Odedokun (2003) 
provides preliminary evidence that grants reduce tax effort in low-income countries, 
using a simple model of tax revenue as a function of per capita income and (to address 
potential endogeneity issues) the lagged ratio of grants to total aid in 72 developing 
countries. Heller (1975) finds that in a cross-section time-series sample of eleven African 
countries, aid not only increases investment, but simultaneously facilitates a reduction in 
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the level of domestic taxes. As is expected, the receipt of grant leads to a reduction in 
taxes for a sub-group of countries in the sample of eleven countries. Interestingly, he also 
finds that loans have a negative impact on taxes.  
There are several country case studies for which the results are also mixed. For 
example, Gang and Khan (1990) find in a time series study on India, that grants and loans 
generally go into development projects with no leakages into consumption and ultimately 
leaves tax effort unchanged. In particular, they find evidence of loans and multilateral aid 
(most multilateral aid is composed of loans) going completely into investment in 
development projects.  
While the composition of foreign aid is important in explaining the variations in 
tax ratios, the form of foreign aid is also important. For instance, Cashel-Cordo and Craig 
(1990) also examine the effects of foreign aid on public sector budgets of developing 
countries taking into consideration whether aid “strings” are successful at restricting the 
behavior of government. The idea is that the ‘strings’ attached to aid vary considerably 
among the three types of donor agencies.
34
 They use pooled time-series cross-section data 
for a sample of 46 countries for the period 1975-1980. Empirically, the structure of 
foreign assistance is found to be crucial for determining the ultimate impact on public 
sector budget. The empirical results show that an additional dollar in LIMF (one type of 
IMF lending) funds reduces current revenues by $4.44.
35
 Thus, LIMF lending 
significantly reduces the size of the public sector. Also, they test whether bilateral loans 
                                                          
34
 The donor agencies are the multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, Inter-America Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
industrial countries comprising the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) such as USAID etc. 
35
 The IMF provides loans through a number of different ‘facilities’ or ‘window’. LIMF is a low 
conditionality loan that is used for mainly budget support in developing countries.  
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and grants have any effect on public expenditure and revenues.
36
 They find ODA bilateral 
loans and bilateral grants from DAC countries having no significant effect in the public 
sector budget. However, bilateral grant does result in a $0.93 reduction in taxes. The 
entire grant amount, they argue, is basically used to replace other sources of public 
revenue and so is returned by the recipient to the private sector.  
Khilji and Zampelli (1994) also examine indirectly the tax revenue effect of 
foreign aid. Particularly, they examine the impact of U.S military and non-military 
assistance on the allocation of public and private spending for eight (8) major recipients 
over the period 1972-1987. The results strongly suggest that U.S military assistance and 
non-military assistance is used to provide tax relief as private consumption increases by 
more than public investment. 
In summary, even though the impact of foreign aid on tax effort was not 
considered in the earlier conventional literature on tax effort, a large number of more 
recent studies have analyzed those effects. Overall, the evidence is mixed. Some studies 
have found foreign aid to affect negatively tax effort, while other studies have found no 
significant effects and yet others have found a positive stimulating effect on tax effort. 
Some of the differences in empirical findings can be attributed to the different country 
samples and time periods used and also to the different methodologies. But clearly, the 
impact of foreign aid on tax effort realized by developing countries is far from settled. 
Another, perhaps more important conclusion from the perspective of this paper, is that 
none of the previous studies have examined the potential impact of debt forgiveness on -
the tax effort of developing countries, which is the main theme of this paper. 
                                                          
36
 One explanation given for this result is that bilateral aid provided by the DAC countries is seen primarily 
to be an alternative source of financing for the LDCs and as such has little impact on expenditure.  
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A Simple Theoretical Framework 
 
 The Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) refers to the expectation of a bailout by an 
entity (in this context, an aid-receiving country government), in the event of financial 
distress. The concept of the SBC was first introduced by Kornai [1980; 2003]. Later, 
several papers have investigated the potential causes of the SBC.
37
 In the context of this 
paper, the SBC is caused by a lack of commitment on the part of the international 
financial community to not bailout “profligate” poor country governments ex post, 
creating an expectation that additional bailouts will come in the future. It is important to 
stress at this point that debt forgiveness/bailout itself –which can be a kind of ad hoc 
‘additional funding’ provided to poor country governments when they would otherwise 
be unable to service their obligations – does not constitute the SBC, but rather it is the 
expectation of bailouts in the future that do.
38
 
Bailouts as a Sequential Game 
 
The problem of bailout expectations can be analyzed using a sequential game 
played between the international financial community and an aid receiving government. 
In this framework, it is assumed that the aid receiving government does not have 
complete information about the payoffs accruing to the international financial community 
or donor country. The international financing community may be one of two types – 
                                                          
37
 Schleifer and Vishny (1994) developed the model of “politicians’ influencing enterprises’ behavior.” It is 
argued that in a bid to maximize their noneconomic objectives, politicians often facilitate enterprises 
operating inefficiently by increasing the enterprises’ employment or output.  In a different model, Li et al. 
(1997) argues that insiders’ or managers’ control rights are the main cause of the SBC. Here if an 
insider/manager enjoys significant benefits associated with control, then when faced with a financial loss, a 
manager will object to liquation proceedings to avoid loss of their control benefit.  
38
 See Rodden (2003) 
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committed or not - and the aid receiving governments must make an assessments about 
the probability that it is the committed type. 
In the first stage of the game the international financial community must decide 
whether or not to provide loans. In addition, at this stage of the game it is assumed that 
the international financial community will also make an announcement that it is its policy 
to never allow bailouts. Officials in the aid receiving government will try to assess the 
credibility of this commitment, making its move at the second stage of the game in light 
of these assessments. At this stage, those government officials can either spend and 
borrow within their means, or over-borrow and attempt to shift the costs onto others. If 
officials in the aid receiving government borrow within reasonable limits to finance its 
necessities, then the game ends. However, if the officials engage in over-borrowing they 
may expect that the international financing community will eventually take over its 
obligation through providing bailouts. The donor country then makes the third move, and 
it must decide either to provide bailout or refuse. If the costs to the international financing 
community of not providing additional funds/bailouts exceed those of providing them, 
the donor government reveals itself to be non-committed. If the government officials in 
the borrowing country have strong beliefs that the international financing community is 
not committed at the first stage of the game to a no-bailout policy, it has incentives to 
raise too little tax revenue. One consequence of raising too little taxes is that debt 
servicing costs will eventually become burdensome as these countries will find it 
increasingly difficult to keep up with servicing charges. The eventual built up of unpaid 
debt servicing charges will mean countries will require bailouts to keep afloat. Once a 
bailout is provided government officials will believe, and rightly so, that additional 
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bailouts will be provided again in the future. Contrastingly, if the government officials 
believe that the donor government will be committed to a no-bailout policy when making 
its fiscal decisions at the first stage, it will spend within its means by raising domestic 
taxes. 
How are Expectations Formed? 
 
Spillover effects or externalities can be an important element in the formation of 
expectations about bailouts. Commitment problems come about because of the spillovers 
associated with not bailing out defaulting governments. However, while some may argue 
that the size of a defaulting institution/country is important in the decision making 
process of donor institutions when deciding to choose the bailout option ex post, others 
are not so convinced by the ‘too large to fail’ argument (Wildasin, 1999). More generally, 
spillovers also exist from the donor side. When a donor institution may be viewed as 
having implicitly guaranteed the liabilities of the borrowing country (see, for example, 
Bai and Wang 1999), and where the donor’s own reputation would be hurt by failing on 
those guarantees.  
There are other possible causes for the commitment problem besides the spillover 
effects argument. One other cause has to do with the role of a donor government in 
enforcing property rights against a defaulting developing country government. If the 
institutions in the donor country are weak, then when the donor country officials are 
approached by creditors to enforce their property rights in the recipient country, the donor 
government may be facing the prospect of failing in its obligations and thus prefer to help 
the creditors through a bailout of the recipient government.  
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In summary, the lack of credible commitment, whatever its causes, can lead 
developing countries (and local governments) to form expectations about future bailouts 
possibilities. 
Theoretical Predictions 
 
The simple theoretical framework above is sufficient to yield a priori 
expectations for the signs of the three variables that capture the existence of a soft budget 
constraint in the tax effort equation: (i) debt forgiveness per unit of GDP, as an annual 
flow; (ii) the accumulated share of debt forgiveness to GDP; and (iii) the debt forgiveness 
signal measured by the number of times a country has received debt forgiveness in the 
past.  
Debt forgiveness per unit of GDP is a measure of the importance of this variable 
as a source of income for a country on an annual basis. We would expect that the higher 
the share of debt forgiveness in GDP the less incentive governments will have to improve 
tax collection effort in terms of enforcement of tax rates, and therefore we would likely 
see a reduction in tax ratios. A similar argument applies with respect to the accumulated 
share of debt forgiveness to GDP. The accumulated stock of past debt forgiveness is 
likely to create a memory in the minds of developing country officials to the extent that 
they come to expect that their debts will be forgiven today and in the future. These 
officials may then be motivated to acquire additional debt; however, the long run 
consequence of this is that they accumulate debts to point where it becomes 
unsustainable. Hence, a priori we would also expect in this case to see a decline in tax 
effort as the accumulated share of GDP rises. Finally, the debt forgiveness signal gives an 
indication of the number of times a country receives debt forgiveness in the past. A 
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higher frequency of debt forgiveness rounds could be interpreted as a positive signal that 
more forgiveness/bail-outs will be received in the future. Here again, a priori we would 
expect a negative relation between the tax ratio and the frequency of bail-out.   
 
Empirical Model 
 
The more recent empirical literature provides guidance concerning the factors 
affecting tax effort, and we follow this literature to build a base specification. To ensure 
that any inferences about the relationship between debt forgiveness and tax effort are 
robust, we attempt to account for the range of all known factors that can help explain the 
tax performance of developing countries. Since we are particularly interested in assessing 
the impact of a soft budget constraint on tax effort, the tax effort model is augmented to 
include the three variables relating to the existence of this budget constraint discussed 
above: namely, debt forgiveness per unit of GDP; accumulated debt forgiveness as a 
share of GDP and the debt forgiveness signal.  
Hence, for the estimation of the model we propose the following linear unobserved 
effects specification:
39
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39 We use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique to estimate a similar linear model specified below: 
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Due to the lack of a unique instrument for DEBTFOR  we estimate a ‘first stage equation’ by regressing 
DEBTFOR  on a number of exogenous determinants including some variables not in the tax effort equation 
for identification purposes: 
itiitititititit FREEARMSODADEBTSEREXTDEBTPGDPDEBTFOR   6543210
  
itPGDP is log of per capita income, itEXTDEBT is the share of total external debt in GDP, itDEBTSER is debt 
service to export, 
itLOANS
is official development assistance (ODA) as a share of GDP, 
itARMS is arms 
imports as a share of GDP and 
itFREE is political rights and civil liberties.  
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where i  indexes the countries in the sample and t  the time period. DEBTFOR is the 
variable that summarizes the existence of the soft budget constraint and is measured in 
the three different ways mentioned above. TE denotes the country’s level of tax effort 
measured as tax revenues as a share of gross domestic product ( GDP) and 1itTE  is its 
lagged value, i stands for country fixed effects, t  are time dummies, Y is GDP  per 
capita (measured in constant US$), POP
 
the rate of population growth, XM the share of 
exports plus imports in gross domestic product (GDP). To represent the non-agricultural 
sector, we include both services and manufacture value added as a share of GDP.  Instead 
of including official development assistance (ODA) as a total, we disaggregate this 
amount into its loans and grants component to help address any possible endogeneity that 
may arise. it denotes the error term. 
We proceed by using the system GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond 
(1998), and which was first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). Apart from the 
endogeneity of our variable of interest, that may be correlated with the error term there 
are some other econometrics issues that needs addressing. The lagged dependent variable 
is also endogenous because it is correlated with the country-specific fixed effects, 
potentially biasing the estimates. Other econometrics issues encountered include the 
potential correlation between the country fixed effects and other explanatory variables in 
the model, in addition to the relatively short time dimension (T=18) and a relatively 
larger country dimension (N=66) of the dataset. To address the endogeneity problem, one 
would usually use instrumental variables estimation (two stage least square). However, 
finding good instruments can be challenging. System GMM allows us to address the 
problem of endogeneity by way of specifying two (2) equations: one in difference and the 
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other in levels. The set of equations in levels uses lagged first-differences as instruments, 
while the set of equations in first-differences uses lagged levels as instruments. 
Therefore, the first-difference of equation (1) is not correlated with the errors from that 
equation, thus making the endogenous variables pre-determined and uncorrelated with 
the ‘new’ error term in equation (1). Further, the issue of the correlation between the 
fixed effects and other explanatory variables in the model is also solved by this 
estimation strategy since the first difference transformation ultimately gets rid of the 
country fixed effects. Also, the system GMM estimator was also designed to address the 
problem/issue of relatively small T - large N panels.
40
  
To address the issue of the fractional dependent variable, we re-specify equation 
(1) and employ the technique of quasi-maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the 
model below: 
)()|( aitaitatit XXXTEE 


                                                                                (2)
 
where itX = [DEBTFORit, POPit, XMit, SERVit, MANUit, LOANSit, GRANTSit, Yit]. The 
individual variables in Xit are as defined above. at  allows for a different intercept in 
each year. To that end, it allows the average tax ratio to change over time.

iX is the time 
averages for each of the explanatory variables in the regression.  Note that we are only 
able to identify the scaled coefficients (indexed by a). However, this is precisely what we 
want since this is the only way the average partial effects are identified.  
The main reason for specifying a fractional probit model is that the left-hand side 
variable in our model is a proportion and thus is bounded between zero and one. Standard 
                                                          
40
 In large -T panels, a shock to a country’s unobserved heterogeneity will decline overtime. Similarly, the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2009). In these 
cases, using the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator would not be necessary. 
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linear models may not provide an accurate picture of the effects of debt forgiveness on 
the tax ratio throughout the entire distribution of debt forgiveness. Hence, if the tax ratio 
depends on debt forgiveness, the relationship must be bounded – otherwise the tax ratio is 
eventually predicted to be greater than one. This therefore necessitates the use of quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation methods.  
The estimation of a separate equation for debt forgiveness is important in its own 
right. From a policy viewpoint it will help identify what country characteristics 
international donors consider in order to determine how much debt forgiveness different 
developing countries deserve. Estimating a separate equation for debt forgiveness will 
also enable us to test for the reverse causality from tax effort to debt forgiveness. We 
therefore specify a debt forgiveness equation as: 
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All the variables in equation (3) are as defined above. Again, because of potential 
endogeneity of our variable of interest TE,
41
 in addition to the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable, we proceed with system GMM estimation of equation (3). 
 
Now, besides our key explanatory variables, the other explanatory variables 
employed in the basic model follow those in the conventional tax effort literature. The 
level of development of a country is proxied with per capita GDP. It is argued that a 
                                                          
41 Potential endogeneity of our key right hand side variable, the tax effort  TE  calls for the use of the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique. The model to be estimated will be: 
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However, we must first specify a ‘first stage equation’ since there is no unique instrument(s) for the tax 
effort. In this stage we regress the tax ratio on a range of known determinants of tax efforts including some 
variables not in the debt forgiveness equation for identification purposes: 
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All the variables in this equation are as defined above.  
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higher level of development goes together with a higher capacity to collect taxes, as well 
as a higher relative demand for income elastic public goods and services (Chelliah, 1971; 
Bahl, 1971). Generally, we would expect a positive relation between the level of per 
capita income and the level of tax effort. Demographic characteristics also play a role in 
determining tax effort. The rate of population growth could have a negative relation to 
tax efforts if the population grows at a rate faster than the tax system is able to 
accommodate this change by failing to capture new taxpayers.  
A frequently used measure for the availability of ‘tax handles’ in a country is the 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and it is expected to positively influence the level 
of tax effort. Trade-related taxes are easier to collect, relative to say income taxes or other 
domestic taxes since the goods involved enter or leave the country at specified locations. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relation between the tax ratio and the degree of openness 
of an economy. 
The sectoral composition of national income may also affect the ability to tax and 
collect taxes. The larger the relative importance of the agriculture sector in GDP, the 
lower the need to spend on governmental activities and services, since many public sector 
activities and services are city-based (Tanzi, 1992). According to Bird et al. (2008), a 
government may decide for political reasons to exempt from taxes a large share of 
agricultural activities. Agriculture is also well-known to be a hard-to-tax sector. 
Therefore a higher non-agriculture share in GDP should thus produce a higher tax ratio. 
Foreign aid - consisting of loans and grants – can also impact the level of tax 
effort in an economy. It has been argued in the international aid literature that grants are 
free resources that substitute for domestic revenues, while the burden of future loan 
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repayments induces policymakers to mobilize taxes or, at least, to protect current levels 
of revenue protection (Brautigam, 2008). Therefore, we would expect grants to have a 
negative effect on the tax ratio while loans should have a positive effect.  
One of the hallmarks of a successful tax reform, according to Bird et al. (2008) is 
the improvement in the quality and quantity of public services offered, which 
subsequently will increase overall well-being. However for such an outcome to be made 
possible, the political or societal institutions in a country play a vital role. Those authors 
argue that the fiscal reality in many developing countries does not changed significantly 
despite wholesale tax reform effort being undertaken. Tax revenue performance is still 
below expectations. They then posit that if the taxpayers’ perception of the political 
landscape is one that does not take their interests or preferences into consideration, then 
tax reform effort will be unsuccessful – if success is measured in terms of tax revenue 
performance. If taxpayers perceive that their interests are poorly represented in political 
institutions and governments are more wasteful than helpful they are less inclined to vote 
for higher levels of taxation and comply with their tax obligations. Also, if corruption is 
rampant and citizens have little trust in authority then they will have a low incentive to 
cooperate. On the other hand, if their interests are properly represented they will have 
more incentive to contribute and the supply of public goods will increase to their benefit. 
Societal institutions, captured by corruption, voice and accountability, are used here as 
possible indicators of the extent to which citizens feel they have a meaningful ‘voice’ in 
influencing the state.  
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Data 
 
A panel dataset covering 66 developing countries for the period 1989-2006 is 
used in the estimation. The starting year for our sample is determined by the availability 
of data for our variable of interest, debt forgiveness. Table 3 presents the summary 
statistics of all the variables used in the regressions. The main variable of interest is the 
accumulated stock of debt forgiven as a percentage of constant prices GDP. The 
definition of the variable as an accumulated stock is deemed more relevant toward the 
formation of bailout expectations than other alternative definitions, such as the current 
flows of debt forgiveness or even the frequency of bailouts. Debt forgiveness, as defined 
in the Global Development Finance (GDF) Manual of 2008 is the amount of the debt 
stock, principal, and/or interest that will not be paid from the beginning of the 
observation period to the particular year being observed.
42
 This figure does not include 
the amounts for either debt buybacks or debt swaps since they do not reflect a 
reduction/change in the debt stock.  
 
  
                                                          
42
 It is quite likely that bailout expectations will be also affected by the amount of forgiven debt prior to the 
beginning of the observation period. However, I do not have reliable data on debt forgiveness prior to 1989. 
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  Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics, 1989-2006 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax revenue share of GDP 732 0.158 0.066 0.012 0.448 
Debt forgiveness share of GDP 1589 0.011 0.052 0 0.942 
Accumulated debt Forgiveness/GDP 1589 0.081 0.18 0 1.727 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 1703 3.42 3.669 0 16 
Per Capita GDP 1794 2065.76 2338.43 81.01 16787.55 
      
Population Growth 1901 1.606 1.428 -7.855 11.181 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP 1781 0.799 0.44 0.107 3.507 
Services Value Added/GDP 1758 0.296 0.107 0.078 0.721 
Manufacture Value Added/GDP 1759 0.501 0.118 0.165 0.818 
Loans share of GDP 1554 0.062 0.087 0.00003 0.832 
      
Grants share of GDP 1399 0.0377 0.133 -0.0011 1.94 
Total External Debt/GDP 1641 0.765 0.652 0.002 5.193 
Foreign Direct Investment/GDP 1736 2.82 4.102 -19.244 46.488 
Free 1800 5.975 3.544 0 12 
External Debt/ Export 1643 0.037 0.061 0.00003 0.688 
      
Debt Service/Export 1467 0.163 0.131 0.0002 1.523 
Arms Imports share of GDP 1639 0.003 0.017 0 0.507 
 
 We measure the dependent variable – Tax Effort – as the share of tax revenues in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Data for this variable come from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) for 2009.  The data on loans and grants are taken from the  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD.Stat) database. The 
data for the other control variables including GDP per capita, population growth, exports, 
imports, the share of agriculture in GDP, the share of manufacture in GDP and the share 
of services in GDP come from the WDI database. The data for the governance variables 
are taken from the Freedom House (2008) and the Polity IV (2009) databases. The 
Freedom House database reports scores on both political rights and civil liberties. These 
scores range on a scale from one-to-seven, with one representing the highest degree of 
freedom and seven the lowest. However, to facilitate easy interpretation of the 
 67 
 
coefficients on these variables we added the reported scores for both political rights and 
civil liberties and then subtract the sum from 14. This means that higher values represent 
improved freedom.
43
  The Polity IV database reports a composite measure of governance 
based on if a country is democratic or autocratic. This score ranges from -10 to +10 ten 
with +10 representing a strong democracy.  
 
Results   
 
The table showing the results for the tax effort model using fixed effects 
instrumental variables (2SLS) estimation is shown in Appendix B, table B5. As a first 
step we include all three proxies of the soft budget constraint in the same specification. 
These results are presented in column (1). As accumulated debt forgiveness increases by 
one percentage point, tax revenues decline by 0.28 percentage point. This result is 
indicative of the level of substitutability between aid monies, or more precisely forgiven 
debts and tax effort in our group of developing countries. Further, this result may also 
suggest that government officials are using aid monies to relieve the taxable population 
of some of its tax burden to lengthen their own political careers. The openness indicator 
is positive and statistically significant as expected. This is evidence to support the 
hypothesis that imports and exports are indeed easier to tax since they take place at 
specified locations. The level of growth in the population, according to theory is also 
supposed to affect tax revenues negatively. The result in column (1) confirms this 
relationship. The inclusion of annual debt forgiveness, accumulated debt forgiveness and 
debt forgiveness signal in specifications (2), (3) and (4) respectively, presents a 
somewhat discouraging picture. While both annual debt forgiveness and accumulated 
                                                          
43
 See Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2004; 2008) and Ndikumana (2004). 
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debt forgiveness are negatively related to tax effort they fail to achieve statistically 
significance. However, per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant suggesting 
that as income increases so does the capacity to tax. In addition, the openness indicator is 
also statistically significant as expected. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology 
may, however produce bias results if there is potential dynamism in the relationship we 
are studying. Therefore we will proceed to estimate a dynamic model (system GMM) to 
account for any dynamism that may exist.  
The results of the dynamic model are displayed in table 4.  These results are 
encouraging not only because the directions of many of these estimates are in line with 
economic theory but also because more of these variables achieve significance which was 
not achieved with the fixed effects instrumental variables estimator. The inclusion of all 
three proxies of ‘softness’ in specification (1) reveals that only the debt forgiveness 
signal achieves significance at the 95 percent level. The two other proxies are not 
significant; however the direction of each of their coefficient estimates follow 
hypotheses.  When we include each of the proxies separately accumulated debt 
forgiveness (column 3) is now significant, though weakly. Debt forgiveness signal 
(column 4) continues to be strongly significant with an improvement in significance 
when it is included as the only proxy of softness.  
Interestingly, loan as a fraction of GDP is now positive and statistically 
significant across all specifications. This finding gives credence to the hypothesis by 
Gupta et al. (2007) that the burden of repayment of these loans propels these countries to 
sustain or even increase their tax collections. While statistical significance is important, 
economic significance is also of equal or greater importance. In terms of the loans 
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variable, for every one percentage point increase in loans received tax collections 
increased on average by at least 0.22 percentage points.  Population is the other control 
that gains significance in two of the four regressions (see table 4) and encouragingly this 
significance is achieved in the expected direction. Overall, the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimates obtained with GMM is smaller relative to those obtained with fixed 
effects instrumental variables.  
  Table 2.  GMM Regression Results to Address Endogeneity, 1989-2006 
Model 
Estimation Method 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
(1) 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
(3) 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
(4) 
(A) SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT     
Annual Debt Forgiveness 
 
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness 
 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 
-0.0061 
 (0.0327) 
-0.0158 
 (0.0138) 
-0.0023 
     (0.0011)** 
    -0.0111 
    (0.0364) 
 
 
      -0.0306 
      (0.0181)* 
 
 
 
 
        -0.0028 
(0.0010)*** 
B) DEVELOPMENT     
Per Capita GDP 
 
Population Growth 
0.0026 
(0.0059) 
-0.0020 
(0.0025) 
     0.0007 
    (0.0068) 
    -0.0067 
    (0.0028)** 
-0.0004 
(0.0074) 
-0.0062 
       (0.0029)** 
        0.0046 
       (0.0056) 
       -0.0016 
       (0.0024) 
C) OPENNESS     
(Exports + Imports) 0.0036 
(0.0065) 
     0.0143 
    (0.0087) 
0.0138 
(0.0092) 
        0.0009 
       (0.0067) 
D) ECONOMIC STRUCTURE     
Services Value Added 
 
Manufacture Value Added 
0.0514 
(0.0495) 
0.0551 
(0.0626) 
     0.0508 
    (0.0581) 
     0.0430 
    (0.0720) 
0.0674 
(0.0634) 
0.0680 
(0.0790) 
        0.0448 
       (0.0474) 
        0.0416 
       (0.0597) 
E) FOREIGN AID     
Loans 
 
Grants 
0.2700 
    (0.0950)*** 
-0.0659 
(0.2611) 
      0.2184 
    (0.0988)** 
    -0.1057 
    (0.3126) 
0.3041 
(0.1165)*** 
-0.1235 
(0.3263) 
        0.2828 
       (0.0917)*** 
       -0.0741 
       (0.2639) 
F) OTHER VARIABLES     
Lagged Tax Ratio 0.7877 
     (0.1080)*** 
      0.6947 
    (0.1641)*** 
0.6710 
      (0.1689)*** 
0.8267 
      (0.1058)*** 
Constant -0.0193 
(0.0180) 
-0.0001 
(0.0185) 
-0.0065 
(0.0200) 
-0.0270 
(0.0182) 
Sargan (p-value)         0.110        0.270 0.524 0.401 
AR(2) (p-value)         0.735        0.523 0.423 0.825 
Observations          370          370 370 372 
Notes: All specifications contain year dummies. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level, 
and * significance at 10% level. Dependent variable is the tax ratios - tax revenues divided by GDP. The standard 
errors for the systems GMM model are robust to arbitrary serial correlation.  
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Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation was also utilized in this essay. This was 
done with the objective of accounting for the fractional left-hand side variable that 
neither the 2SLS technique nor the GMM technique can handle. The results are reported 
in table 5. We compute average partial effects (APEs) to make them comparable to the 
estimates obtained in the linear model. Encouragingly, these results tell a similar story. 
When all three proxies are included in specification (1) (table 5) only the debt forgiveness 
signal achieves significance. However, unlike in the linear models the annual debt 
forgiveness flow (column 2) now becomes significant at a 95 percent level. This 
coefficient estimate may be interpreted to mean that a one percentage point increase in 
the annual amount received in debt forgiveness can possibly lead to as much as a 0.45 
percentage point decline in tax revenues. A similar story can be told about accumulated 
debt forgiveness (column 3) and the debt forgiveness signal (column 4). Both of these 
coefficient estimates are negative and strongly statistically significant. In addition to all 
of the proxies being in line with economic theory, per capita GDP is now positive and 
statistically significant across all specifications in table 5. For example, in specification 
(1, table 5) this coefficient estimate can be interpreted to mean that a 10 percent increase 
in per capita GDP (which captures the level of development within a country) will likely 
lead to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the tax ratios of countries. The result obtained 
for services value added as a share of GDP is unexpected. This variable is included in the 
model to capture the ease with which a government can tax such sector; as such we 
expect to find a positive coefficient. However, this estimate turns out to be negative and 
statistically significant across all specifications.  
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  Table 3. Fractional Probit Regression Results, 1989-2006 
Model 
 
Estimation Method 
Fractional Probit 
QMLE 
Coefficient 
(1) 
 
 
APEs 
(1) 
Fractional Probit 
QMLE 
Coefficient 
(2) 
 
 
APEs 
(2) 
(A) SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT     
Annual Debt Forgiveness 
 
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness 
 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 
-0.3780 
 (4.3258) 
-0.5662 
 (0.9847) 
-0.0412          
       (0.0150)*** 
     -0.0321 
     (0.3677) 
     -0.0481 
     (0.0837) 
     -0.0035 
     (0.0013)*** 
    -6.3075 
    (3.0217)** 
  -0.4541    
(0.2176)** 
(B) DEVELOPMENT     
Per Capita GDP 
 
Population Growth 
 0.4984 
       (0.1568)*** 
-0.0232 
  (0.0451) 
      0.0424 
(0.0133)*** 
     -0.0020 
     (0.0038) 
      0.2415 
     (0.1466)* 
     -0.0116 
     (0.0562)  
   0.0174 
  (0.0106)* 
-0.0008 
   (0.0040) 
(C) OPENNESS     
(Exports + Imports) -0.0973 
  (0.1441) 
     -0.0083 
     (0.0122) 
     -0.0673 
     (0.2168) 
   -0.0048 
   (0.0156) 
(D) ECONOMIC STRUCTURE     
Services Value Added 
 
Manufacture Value Added 
-1.5783 
      (0.6821)** 
-0.7591 
  (0.6337) 
     -0.1342 
     (0.0580)** 
     -0.0645 
     (0.5390) 
     -1.9226 
     (0.7408)*** 
     -0.8927 
     (0.6548) 
   -0.1384 
 (0.0533)*** 
   -0.0643 
   (0.0471) 
        
 
(E) FOREIGN AID     
Loans 
 
Grants 
 
       -1.3006 
       (1.3359) 
 3.5929 
       (5.5540) 
     -0.1106 
     (0.1136) 
      0.3054 
     (0.4721) 
      0.0344 
     (1.3353) 
      3.2315 
     (5.0921) 
    0.0025 
   (0.0961) 
     0.2327 
   (0.3666) 
Constant -1.5588 
       (0.2236)*** 
     -0.1325 
     (0.0190)*** 
      1.4597 
    (0.2218)*** 
    0.1051                
(0.0160)*** 
Scale factor .085          .072  
Observations 272 272         272 272 
Notes: All models contain year dummies. For the fractional probit model, standard errors are obtained by 
bootstrapping using bootstrap replications. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% 
level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Dependent variable is the tax ratios - tax revenues divided by GDP. 
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     Table 5 cont’d: Fractional Probit Regression Results, 1989 - 2006 
Model 
 
Estimation Method 
Fractional Probit 
QMLE 
Coefficient 
(3) 
 
 
APEs 
(3) 
Fractional Probit 
QMLE 
Coefficient 
(4) 
 
 
APEs 
(4) 
(A) SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT     
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness 
 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 
    -1.9201 
 (0.4887)*** 
 
 
-0.1152 
    (0.0293)*** 
 
 
     -0.0501 
    (0.0126)*** 
 
 
   -0.0036 
(0.0009)*** 
(B) DEVELOPMENT     
Per Capita GDP 
 
Population Growth 
 
     0.3403 
    (0.1538)** 
    -0.0227 
    (0.0483) 
     0.0204 
    (0.0092)** 
    -0.0014 
    (0.0029) 
      0.5197 
     (0.1365)*** 
     -0.0213 
     (0.0541) 
    0.0359 
(0.0094)*** 
   -0.0015 
    (0.0037) 
(C) OPENNESS     
(Exports + Imports)     -0.0985 
    (0.2477) 
    -0.0059 
    (0.0149) 
     -0.1064 
     (0.1625) 
   -0.0073 
   (0.0112) 
(D) ECONOMIC STRUCTURE     
Services Value Added 
 
Manufacture Value Added 
    -1.7516 
(0.7119)** 
    -0.9511 
    (0.7721) 
    -0.1051 
    (0.0427)** 
    -0.0571 
    (0.0463) 
     -1.5186 
     (0.6578)** 
     -0.6750 
     (0.5801) 
   -0.1048 
   (0.0454)** 
   -0.0466 
   (0.0400) 
(E) FOREIGN AID     
Loans 
 
Grants 
    -1.0741 
    (1.0952) 
     2.9268 
    (4.8328) 
    -0.0644 
    (0.0657) 
     0.1756 
    (0.2899) 
     -1.1821 
     (1.3211) 
      3.7673 
     (4.8393) 
   -0.0816 
   (0.0912) 
    0.2599 
   (0.3339) 
Constant     -1.3592 
    (0.2023)*** 
    -0.0816 
  (0.0121)*** 
    -1.6748 
 (0.1518)*** 
   -0.1156 
   (0.0105) 
Scale factor       0.060        0.069  
Observations        272 272        272 272 
  Notes: All models contain year dummies. For the fractional probit model, standard errors are obtained by   
  bootstrapping using bootstrap replications. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5%   
  level, * indicates significance at 10% level. Dependent variable is the tax ratios - tax revenues divided by GDP. 
 
In summary, the proxies for the soft budget constraint do seem to have a robust 
impact on the tax ratios for the countries in our sample once we take into account other 
factors such as openness, per capita GDP, loans, grants and population growth. These 
results give credence to the hypothesis that the amount of tax collected depends on the 
frequency and intensity of bailouts.   
Another interesting question that arises is whether countries with lower tax ratios 
were provided with more debt forgiveness. This is part of the endogeneity of the tax ratio 
and debt forgiveness story but also, as argued in the previous section, an important policy 
question on its own. In an attempt to answer this question, we estimated equation (3) 
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using three different measures of the left-hand side variable. These are the annual debt 
forgiveness flow per unit of GDP, accumulated debt forgiveness and debt forgiveness 
signal. The results for the fixed effects instrumental variables approach are reported in 
table 6. Table 7 contains the results from the systems GMM estimation strategy. The 
results in table 6 are mixed. The tax ratio is not significantly different from zero in any of 
these specifications. The non-significance of the tax ratio could be a consequence of the 
poor first stage statistics. Per capita GDP is negative across all specifications as expected 
but significant in only the specification with accumulated debt forgiveness flow as the 
dependent variable. Total external debts per unit of GDP and debt service as a share of 
export are negative and statistically significant in some of the specifications. These 
findings runs counter to expectation. However, arms imports share of GDP is positive but 
weakly significant. Again, due to the weakness of the first stage statistics from the fixed 
effects instrumental variables estimation we went ahead and employ the systems GMM 
estimation strategy 
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      Table 4.  2SLS Regression Results allowing the Tax ratio to be Endogenous, 1989 -2006     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Notes: All specifications contain year dummies. *** indicates significance at 1% level, **      
      significance at 5% level, and * significance at 10% level. The standard errors for the fixed effects  
      instrumental variables model are robust to arbitrary serial correlation. 
 
 The findings from the systems GMM estimations are reported in Table 7. These 
results are more optimistic. Our variable of interest, the tax ratio, is negative and 
statistically significant in two of the three specifications. On average, for every one 
percentage point less of tax revenues collected a country receives as much as 2.5 
percentage point increase in debt forgiveness. This finding provides support to the 
hypothesis that the international financing community, with its well-intentioned action to 
lessen the debt burden of these countries could actually be perpetuating a cycle of 
poverty. In this sense, these countries will find it increasingly difficult to provide the 
necessary social services and infrastructure needed for the achievement of the targeted 
goals of growth and development. Overall, the controls perform reasonably well. Per 
capita GDP which indicates the level of development of a country and therefore its need 
Model 
Estimation Method 
 
Dependent Variable 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
Annual Flow 
 
(1) 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
Accumulated 
Flow 
(2) 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
Signal 
 
(3) 
(A) TAX EFFORT    
Tax Revenues to GDP -1.5727 
(1.9988) 
1.0046 
(2.1785) 
19.9786 
(37.0577) 
(B) NEEDS    
Per Capita GDP 
 
Total External Debt to GDP 
 
Debt Service to Export 
-0.0119 
(0.0996) 
0.0445 
(0.0619) 
-0.0134 
(0.0069)* 
-0.3280 
(0.1662)* 
-0.2794 
(0.1184)** 
-0.0207 
(0.0179) 
-0.6466 
(2.6692) 
-2.4810 
(1.2755)* 
0.0688 
(0.1144) 
(C) POLITICAL INTEREST    
Arms Imports -0.1709 
(0.6116) 
1.5683 
(0.8175)* 
20.9699 
(12.4992) 
(D) GOVERNANCE    
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 0.0027 
(0.0038) 
0.0123 
(0.0072)* 
-0.1896 
(0.1383) 
(E) OTHER CONTROLS    
Official Development Assistance 0.7879 
(0.4672) 
0.0693 
(0.2457) 
3.7873 
(6.2187) 
Hansen J (p-value) 0.409 0.399 0.576 
Observations 424 424 425 
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for debt forgiveness is negative and strongly significant in two of our specifications. 
Total external debts per unit of GDP and debt service to export are two other controls that 
are indicative of the need of a country for debt forgiveness. Specification 3 (table 7) 
shows that these coefficients are in line with our theory: that is, as the external debts of 
these countries increases to levels beyond what is sustainable so too will debt servicing 
costs. Therefore debt forgiveness will be necessary to help remove the stronghold that 
such debts places on the growth and development of these countries. Specification 1 
(table 7) shows a negative effect of total external debts per unit of GDP on annual debt 
forgiveness but this impact is at best weakly significant.  Institutional quality/governance 
has a positive impact on both accumulated debt forgiveness and debt forgiveness signal.  
This suggests that donors have a preference for economies that has better institutional 
quality or that are better governed. Finally, official development assistance as a share of 
GDP has the expected sign suggesting that the more ODA a country accumulates, the 
more debt forgiveness it will eventual need to prevent a situation of debt overhang.        
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       Table 5.   GMM Regression Results allowing the Tax ratio to be Endogenous, 1989 -2006      
      Notes: All specifications contain year dummies. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** significance at the 5%    
      level, and * significance at 10% level. Dependent variable is the tax ratios - tax revenues divided by GDP. The     
      standard errors for the systems GMM model are robust to arbitrary serial correlation.  
 
  
Model 
Estimation Method 
 
Dependent Variable 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
Annual Flow 
 
(1) 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
Accumulated 
Flow 
(2) 
Linear 
GMM 
Coefficient 
Signal 
 
(3) 
(A) TAX EFFORT    
Tax Revenues to GDP       -2.4717    -1.7655        -1.2108 
 (1.0622)** (0.3979)*** (2.0351) 
(B) NEEDS    
Per Capita GDP 
 
Total External Debt to GDP 
 
Debt Service to Export 
0.0202 
 (0.0487) 
-0.0606 
   (0.0316)* 
-0.0005 
  (0.0010) 
    -0.0858                  
    (0.0209)*** 
    -0.0218 
    (0.0141) 
      0.0010 
     (0.0005) 
      -0.3114 
    (0.1485)** 
0.2351 
    (0.1003)** 
0.0060 
    (0.0028)** 
(C) POLITICAL INTEREST    
Arms Imports 0.2752 0.1028 -0.6728 
 (2.1381) (1.4088) (8.3502) 
(D) GOVERNANCE    
Political Rights and Civil Liberties -0.0042        0.0091 0.0571 
 (0.0068)      (0.0028)***       (0.0199)*** 
(E) OTHER CONTROLS    
Official Development Assistance 2.2282 0.5775 -3.5422 
 (1.1758) (0.3385)* (2.9522) 
(F) LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE    
Annual Debt Forgiveness 
 
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness 
 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 
 
-0.1914 
 (0.6070) 
 
 
      0.8521 
  (0.0379)*** 
 
 
 
 
1.0777 
      (0.0197)*** 
Constant 0.2622 0.8427 1.6578 
 (0.2404)       (0.1505)***     (0.8254)** 
AR(2) p-value 0.315         0.121 0.511 
Sarjan p-value 0.344         0.374 0.209 
Observations 403 403 404 
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Conclusion  
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the international financial community 
may be doing more harm than good by relieving developing countries of their loan 
repayment obligations. The results show that prolonged debt forgiveness is likely to 
create a disincentive to poor countries seeking to improve their tax effort. Further, the test 
to see whether reverse causality is actually present confirms our suspicion. This result 
shows that as countries reduce their tax intake they are given more and more debt 
forgiveness to make up for the shortfall in tax revenues. Therefore one can safely 
conclude that while the international financing community is encouraging these countries 
to increase their tax intake, they unintentionally created the problem of low tax revenues 
by providing more debt forgiveness to these countries. These results may be comforting 
to the detractors of this mode of assistance provided to developing countries who often 
argue that it might lead them to engage in over-borrowing with the expectation that their 
creditors will forgive them time and again. Thus perpetuating a cycle of aid dependence, 
which in and of itself can lead to chronic macroeconomic imbalances due to the volatility 
of this mode of financing. Also, some would argue that debt forgiveness initiatives are an 
insufficient remedy to the economic problems facing poor countries and these results in 
some ways confirm their conjecture.  The evidence shows a consistently lower level of 
tax revenue collection across the different specification which will ultimately mean 
lowered or sub-standard public service provision and lower growth possibilities. 
These results have a particular strong policy implication for both developed 
countries and developing countries. In the case of developed countries, they could include 
restrictive covenants in debt forgiveness contracts that compel developing countries to 
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sustain or even to increase their current tax collections effort. In addition, the 
international financial community could tie access to debt forgiveness monies to the 
creditworthiness of developing countries. The idea is, if developing countries continue to 
use debt forgiveness monies as a substitute for raising their own tax revenues, then the 
pool of funds available for debt forgiveness will eventually dry-up. So if it is tied to some 
measure of creditworthiness then that could induce developing countries to raise their tax 
efforts. Failure on the part of developing countries to increase tax efforts could result in 
them losing access to future loans.  
The most important contribution of this paper has been to extend the conventional 
model of tax effort, showing that debt forgiveness can significantly contribute to impede 
the development of sustainable fiscal systems in the developing world, and that the 
damage is increased with the amount and frequency of debt forgiveness. Of course, in 
order to fully understand the tax performance of any one country one needs to pay close 
attention to the fact that debt forgiveness decisions are made on a case-by-case basis and 
are tailored to each debtor country’s individual situation. However, the estimated average 
effects found in this paper should bring significant caution with the implementation of 
this type of policy by the international community.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines empirically the fiscal response of government to 
foreign aid. The first essay examines specifically whether the switch from tied aid to 
untied aid affect spending in critical public expenditure sectors; namely, health, 
education, housing and community amenities.  Further to this question, we revisit the old 
question of fungibility of foreign aid to analyze the overall extent of fungibility in light of 
the switch to untied foreign aid, the now more popular mode of transferring assistance to 
developing countries.  The question therefore is whether national domestic priorities 
coincide or not with what the international community has traditionally deemed should be 
priority.  
To test these predictions we use country-by-country data for 57 countries for the 
1973-2006 period. As expected, average spending in the pro-poor expenditure sector 
(PPE) increased with increases in untied foreign assistance. We also find that, on average, 
more is spent out of a dollar of untied foreign aid s in the PPE sector than is the case with 
tied foreign aid. In addition, the results also suggest that fungibility is still an issue even 
after accounting for the effects of untied aid. However, one could argue that fungibility 
may not be as bad as it appears since the switch to untied aid improves spending in the 
sectors that are essential for growth and development. 
The second essay examines whether tax effort is affected by the frequency and 
intensity of debt forgiveness. In an attempt to answer this question, a second question 
arose, that is, are countries with lower tax ratios provided with more debt forgiveness? 
This latter question is important empirically, but from a policy perspective it is also 
important to investigate whether the well-intentioned action of the international financial 
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community is perpetuating a cycle of low tax revenues among the countries in our 
sample. The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that the frequency and 
intensity of debt forgiveness will negatively affect tax effort since the recipients of 
‘bailout’ will no longer have the burden of repayment, ceteris paribus. To test these 
hypotheses, we use a country-level dataset of debt forgiveness over the 1989-2006 
period. 
Our empirical analysis reveals that the frequency and intensity of bailouts have a 
significantly negative impact on tax effort. We theorize that the ‘negative’ effect of debt 
forgiveness is possible, especially if there is a lack of commitment on the part of the 
international financial community to not bailout “profligate” poor country governments 
ex post, as this will create an expectation that additional bailouts will come in the future. 
The evidence provides some support for our hypothesis as we show that the frequency 
and intensity of bailouts produces a negative effect on tax effort.  
The complex interplay of foreign aid, government spending and tax effort is 
important for policymakers to understand as they attempt to achieve the targeted growth 
and development outcomes associated with the millennium development agenda. A 
worthwhile extension of these essays would be to account for the impact of foreign direct 
investment which could prevent sustainable increases in tax revenues and thus perpetuate 
low levels of spending on well-needed social services and infrastructure. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
  Table A1: Descriptive Statistics, 1973-2006 
Country Obs. PPE  OTH AID OAID AIDNS GNIPC 
Argentina 23 80.863 178.126 0.721 2.195 0.049 4874.73 
Bangladesh 12 2.777 10.172 0.788 6.784 0.042 169.19 
Belize 17 138.679 244.703 29.386 64.260 154.908 1510.77 
Bhutan 22 36.708 121.564 14.910 44.656 32.81 415.52 
Bolivia 20 45.046 58.871 14.210 37.889 2.703 761.07 
Botswana 23 206.367 235.556 31.839 51.161 156.30 1344.15 
Brazil 11 64.618 139.925 0.186 0.966 0.289 2070.63 
Burkina Faso 15 6.621 9.607 4.033 16.561 39.197 215.005 
Burma 12 6.706 14.941 0.751 6.629 2.799 196.644 
Burundi 8 7.174 15.862 7.701 10.504 18.269 138.207 
Cameroon 23 30.871 71.641 3.869 13.439 8.620 747.098 
Chile 19 242.621 173.598  2.026 3.777 5.286 3273.20 
China 9 1.081 14.158 0.344 1.545 0.020 518.740 
Colombia 9 99.393 81.765 0.977 2.658 5.443 1774.17 
Costa Rica 14 200.902 111.592 5.343 16.443 0.576 1613.36 
Dom. Republic 12 48.167 73.254 3.403 8.615 0.834 904.233 
Egypt 21 52.225 66.203 7.094 20.255 0.546 674.199 
El Salvador 29 39.884 60.878 9.104 22.199 37.730 1186.25 
Ethiopia 26 5.344 10.750 1.850 5.395 9.650 117.418 
Fiji  19 161.895 232.959 15.873 32.321 93.256 1822.03 
Ghana 20 18.376 24.201 2.932 12.485 18.169 401.063 
Guatemala 13 26.594 47.770 4.516 5.528 0.771 1067.62 
India 27 4.458 12.560 0.390 1.433 0.187 308.854 
Indonesia 26 19.504 61.595 0.947 4.126 2.462 580.980 
Iran 12 112.146 133.853 1.404 0.971 2.183 1491.99 
Jordan 32 116.891 217.793 48.086 116.227 8.120 1412.81 
Kenya 21 27.837 36.098 6.285 14.534 30.027 339.133 
Liberia 11 37.076 91.314 6.418 17.673 22.902 571.535 
Madagascar 11 7.544 16.461 6.242 11.672 13.456 219.260 
Malawi 13 9.911 30.044 4.774 12.56 10.990 182.222 
Maldives 19 184.618 241.209 43.811 54.750 61.942 1018.38 
Mali 12 8.006 13.491 6.808 22.253 0.637 213.002 
Mauritius 27 161.154 191.487 8.090 24.455 86.933 2259.23 
Mexico 10 176.582 128.479 0.569 1.456 1.583 3388.35 
Mongolia 15 10.990 27.277 8.409 62.592 20.509 369.186 
Morocco 19 60.796 102.233 4.830 13.076 0.031 902.414 
Nepal 33 6.185 16.386 3.054 10.329 13.757 181.788 
Papua New 
Guinea 
12 71.643 108.310 13.967 28.013 1.987 805.773 
Paraguay   20 26.082 45.722 4.480 12.698 9.190 1183.81 
Philippines 33 27.208 57.451 1.432 6.464 0.902 775.963 
Solomon Islands 12 54.873 99.141 19.795 82.638 237.597 531.276 
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  Table A1 cont’d: Descriptive Statistics, 1973-2006 
Country Obs. PPE OTH AID OAID AIDNS GNIPC 
Sri Lanka 24 21.092 45.125 4.112 17.076 20.029 432.48 
St. Vin. & Gren.  15 235.757 399.463 27.414 33.703 137.881 2304.97 
Syria 8 29.079 92.822 4.537 13.931 1.224 955.29 
Tanzania 8 17.487 49.142 4.482 17.594 48.818 276.66 
Thailand 30 76.662 99.363 1.210 8.034 2.799 1363.51 
Tonga 11 84.347 264.485 17.351 132.465 3.879 827.821 
Tunisia 27 138.943 206.480 4.790 18.836 1.169 1410.06 
Turkey 20 113.259 222.429 1.301 2.209 1.471 2178.18 
Uganda 8 5.466 11.101 1.140 5.976 0.080 223.786 
Uruguay 22 166.432 207.582 4.418 5.226 3.474 3940.14 
Vanuatu 9 96.619 201.282 17.718 132.484 445.688 978.390 
Viet Nam 12 12.727 11.817 2.651 10.826 0.260 341.329 
Yemen 7 23.830 40.277 7.194 6.361 0.067 294.074 
Zambia 23 36.702 93.996 9.106 30.078 11.497 503.476 
Zimbabwe 9 70.387 86.213 7.484 10.137 8.270 675.608 
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   Table A2: Fungibility Estimates from earlier case studies  
Authors Country (Period) Fungibility (0/1) 
Pack and Pack (1990) Indonesia (1966-1986) -0.411  (=0) 
Pack and Pack (1993) Dominican Republic (1968-1986) 1.049 (=1) 
Ekman and Metell (1993) Kenya (1971-1991) -0.038 (=0) 
Pack and Pack (1998) Sri Lanka (1960-1986) 0.802 (0.802) 
   
Pettersson (2007) Indonesia  (1974-1999) -0.45 
Pettersson (2007) Dominican Republic (1981-1992) 3.12 
Pettersson (2007) Kenya (1978-1998) 0.35 
Pettersson (2007) Sri Lanka (1974-1997) 1.05 
   
My estimates Indonesia (1974-1999) 0.941 
My estimates Dominican Republic (1981-1992) 2.129 
My estimates Kenya (1978-1998) 0.979 
My estimates Sri Lanka (1974-1997) 1.006 
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   Table A3:  Data Definition and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Pro-poor Expenditures sectors 
(PPE) 
Education + Health + Housing & 
Amenities expenditures divided by 
total population 
GFS and Author’s Calculation 
Other Expenditures sectors 
(OTH) 
General Public Services + Public 
Order and Safety+ Recreational, 
Cultural and Religious Affairs 
Services expenditures divided by 
total population 
GFS and Author’s Calculation  
Non-Aid Supported expenditure 
sectors (NAE) 
Defense + Social Security and 
Welfare + Miscellaneous 
expenditure 
GFS and Author’s Calculation 
Population  Total Population WDI(2008) 
Aid to Pro-poor expenditure 
sector (AID) 
This variable measures the share 
of sectoral aid allocated to the pro-
poor expenditure sector.  
Pettersson (2007) and CRS/DAC 
database 
Aid to Other Expenditure sector  
(OAID) 
This variable measures the share 
of sectoral aid allocated to the 
‘other’ expenditure sector. 
Pettersson (2007) and CRS/DAC 
database 
   
Untied Aid (AIDNS) This variable measures the amount 
of aid not allocated to any of the 
development sector. 
CRS/DAC database 
Emergency Aid This is included as a dummy 
variable for the years a country 
experienced a disaster 
Pettersson (2007) and CRS/DAC 
database 
Gross National Income The total output of a country 
divided by population. 
GFS 
Revenue Total own source revenues plus 
any aid (tied and untied) received. 
GFS 
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Table A4: Sample of Countries 
 
Argentina                 Kenya   Vanuatu  
Bangladesh   Liberia   Viet Nam 
Belize    Madagascar  Yemen 
Bhutan    Malawi   Zambia 
Bolivia    Maldives   Zimbabwe 
Botswana  Mali 
Brazil    Mauritius 
Burkina Faso   Mexico 
Burma    Mongolia 
Burundi    Morocco 
Cameroon   Nepal 
Chile    Papua New Guinea 
China    Paraguay 
Colombia  Philippines 
Costa Rica   Solomon Islands 
Dominican Republic  Sri Lanka 
Egypt    St Vincent & Grenadines 
El Salvador   Swaziland 
Ethiopia  Syria 
Fiji    Tanzania 
Ghana    Thailand 
Guatemala   Tonga 
India    Tunisia 
Indonesia  Turkey 
Iran    Uganda 
Jordan    Uruguay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 86 
 
    Table A5: Estimates for the Effect of Aid on both Tax Revenues and the Non-Aid Supported Sectors  
  Non-Aid Expenditure Sectors Tax Revenues 
Country Obs. TAID 
Coefficient 
TAID 
Std. Error 
TAID 
Coefficient 
TAID 
Std. Error 
Argentina 23 0.1320 (0.1029) 0.0927 (0.0808) 
Bangladesh 12  0.4323* (0.2481)    0.3666** (0.1445) 
Belize 17 -0.0754 (0.1190) 0.0089 (0.0313) 
Bhutan 22 -0.2625 (0.1620) 0.0252 (0.0846) 
Bolivia 20 0.0351 (0.1416) -0.1015* (0.0533) 
Botswana 23 0.2216 (0.2162) -0.0933 (0.1320) 
Brazil 11 0.0565 (0.4050) -0.2181 (0.2995) 
Burkina Faso 15 0.1011 (0.3125) 0.0418 (0.2317) 
Burundi 8 0.1863 (0.3555) 0.0583 (0.1161) 
Cameroon 23 0.0055 (0.0733) 0.0411 (0.0396) 
Chile 19 0.0067 (0.0445) 0.0607 (0.0482) 
China 9 -0.3499 (0.3801) -0.3421 (0.3337) 
Colombia 9    -0.5097** (0.2225) 0.1902 (0.2134) 
Costa Rica 14 -0.0433 (0.1487) -0.0486 (0.0556) 
Dom. Republic 12 -0.0674 (0.1758) -0.1934 (0.1285) 
Egypt 21    -0.5481** (0.2159) -0.1218 (0.0856) 
El Salvador 29 -0.0719 (0.1808) -0.0460 (0.2083) 
Ethiopia 26 -0.0734 (0.1574) -0.1218 (0.1403) 
Fiji 19 0.0541 (0.0989)   0.1122* (0.0591) 
Ghana 20 -0.1563 (0.1716) 0.2366 (0.2123) 
Guatemala 13 0.1697 (0.1638) 0.1351 (0.0923) 
India 27 0.0116 (0.0122) 0.0021 (0.0099) 
Indonesia 26 0.1002 (0.1545)     0.1261** (0.0501) 
Iran 12 0.3216 (0.7012) 1.0168 (1.3186) 
Jordan 32   0.1100* (0.0599) -0.0779 (0.0537) 
Kenya 21 0.0498 (0.2158) 0.0239 (0.0952) 
Liberia 11 0.0562 (0.3055)     0.1733** (0.0811) 
Madagascar 11 0.0925 (0.0721) 0.0200 (0.0522) 
Malawi 13 0.1557 (0.2722) 0.0441 (0.0982) 
Maldives 19 0.3049 (0.1949)     0.1162** (0.0547) 
Mali 12 0.3096 (0.3549)   0.2750* (0.1482) 
Mauritius 27    0.0936** (0.0427) -0.0602 (0.0622) 
Mexico 10 -0.4659* (0.2379)     -0.3451*** (0.0528) 
Mongolia 15    -0.3087** (0.1079) -0.1292 (0.1200) 
Morocco 19 0.0500 (0.0496) -0.0173 (0.0342) 
Myanmar (Burma) 12 0.0644 (0.0675) -0.0135 (0.0699) 
Nepal 33 0.1582 (0.1302) 0.0884 (0.0787) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
12 -0.0229 (0.1261) 0.0003 (0.0466) 
   Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  Standard errors are in  
   parenthesis. All variables are in logs; therefore coefficients must be interpreted as elasticities. Time  
   dummies are also included in each equation. The variable of interest, AIDNS (untied aid) is calculated by      
   accumulated general budget support, actions relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country 
   and  general purpose aid.  
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  Table A5: Estimates for the Effect of Aid on both Tax Revenues and the Non-Aid Supported Sectors 
Country Obs. Non- Aid Supported Sectors Tax Revenues 
  TAID 
Coefficient 
TAID 
Std. Error 
TAID 
Coefficient 
TAID 
Std. Error 
Paraguay   20 0.0361 (0.0588) 0.0302 (0.0506) 
Philippines 33 0.0310 (0.1117) -0.0549 (0.0554) 
Solomon Islands 12 -0.5416 (0.9867) -0.2670** (0.1096) 
Sri Lanka 24 -0.0425 (0.1933) -0.0651 (0.0877) 
St. Vin. & Gren. 15 -0.0869 (0.0826) 0.0029 (0.0171) 
Swaziland 16 -0.0689 (0.1681) 0.0083 (0.0642) 
Syria 8 -0.2014 (0.1187) -0.2381* (0.1258) 
Tanzania 8 -0.0912 (0.3648) 0.1618 (0.1838) 
Thailand 30 0.0681 (0.0456) -0.0479 (0.0416) 
Tonga 11 0.0572 (0.1512) -0.1988*** (0.0429) 
Tunisia 27 -0.0579 (0.0713) 0.0176 (0.0334) 
Turkey 20 0.0178 (0.1063) -0.0507 (0.0344) 
Uganda 8 0.0909 (0.7904) -0.4821 (1.0415) 
Uruguay 22 0.0383 (0.0266) 0.0417 (0.0356) 
Vanuatu 9 0.1027 (0.4202) -0.0409 (0.0755) 
Viet Nam 12 -0.0993 (0.0630) 0.0299 (0.0481) 
Yemen 7 0.2906* (0.1268) 1.1260*** (0.2847) 
Zambia 23 -1.2326*** (0.3524) -0.0726 (0.0709) 
Zimbabwe 9 -0.1471 (0.1884) -0.1664* (0.0824) 
   Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  Standard errors are in  
   parenthesis. All variables are in logs; therefore coefficients must be interpreted as elasticities. Time  
   dummies are also included in each equation. The variable of interest, AIDNS (untied aid) is calculated by      
   accumulated general budget support, actions relating to debt and internal transactions in the donor country 
   and general purpose aid.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Source: Global Development Finance 
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 Table B1 : Data Definition and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Tax Effort Tax Revenue as a share of GDP Author’s Calculation 
Per Capita Income Gross Domestic Product divided 
by population 
WDI (2008) 
Population Growth Annual Percentage change in 
population 
WDI(2008) 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP This variable measures the degree 
of openness of an economy 
Author’s Calculation 
Manufacture Value Added  WDI(2008) 
Services Value Added   
Governance This governance variable ranges 
from +10 (strongly democratic) to 
-10(strongly autocratic)  
Polity IV Database 
Political Rights This variable is an indicator of the 
institutions in a country. It enables 
people to participate freely in the 
political process, also having the 
right to vote, and to compete for 
public office, and to elect 
representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public policies 
are accountable to the electorate. 
This index ranges from 1 (good 
governance) to 7(poor 
governance). 
Freedom House Database (2008) 
Civil Liberties This variable is another indicator 
of governance in a country. This 
allows for the freedom  
Freedom House Database (2008) 
Share of Loans in GDP ODA  OECD Online Database 
Share of Grants in GDP  OECD Online Database 
Debt Forgiveness/GDP Debt forgiveness is the sum of the 
GDF categories ‘debt forgiveness 
or reduction’ which measures  the 
nominal amount of principal 
forgiven (including principal and 
interest arrears forgiven) and 
interest forgiven  which measures 
the nominal amount of interest 
forgiven. 
Author’s Calculation 
Accumulated Debt 
Forgiveness/GDP 
 Author’s Calculation 
Debt Forgiveness Signal  Author’s Calculation 
 
 
 
Table B2: Paris Club Initiatives: 
 
The Paris club is only one of the many international organizations that provide 
financial assistance to developing countries, be it through loans, grants or debt relief 
(including debt forgiveness).  The high indebtedness of these countries prompts these 
institutions to re-examine the methods they were used to help developing countries 
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reduce their debts to sustainable levels. The terms of the Classic Initiative involved 
rescheduling of credits at appropriate market rates. However, having recognized that 
developing countries were still unable to improve their financial situation, a different 
and urgent approach was needed. The Toronto terms were implemented by Paris Club 
Members. In October 1988, Paris club creditors agreed to introduce for the first time 
a partial cancellation of the debt of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries. It 
is important to mention that different initiatives to provide debt relief were 
implemented after the implementation of the Classic term initiative but before the 
Toronto terms initiative. However, all these other initiatives only sought to provide 
relief mainly through rescheduling of principal and interest payments. 
 
 
 
Table B3: Data Issues: 
  
The analysis in the paper starts at 1989 since it was not until the Toronto terms 
initiative was signed in October 1988 that debt forgiveness (a change in the debt 
stock) was provided in more significant amounts.    
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  Table B4: Sample of Countries 
Albania Gabon Russia 
Argentina Gambia Rwanda 
Armenia Georgia Seychelles 
Bangladesh Honduras Slovak Republic 
Belarus Hungary South Africa 
Bolivia India Sri Lanka 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Swaziland 
Brazil Iran Syria 
Bulgaria Kazakhstan Thailand 
Burkina Faso Latvia Tunisia 
Burundi Lesotho Turkey 
Cambodia Lithuania Ukraine 
Cameroon Malaysia Uruguay 
Chad Mauritius Venezuela 
Chile Mexico Zambia 
Colombia Moldova Zimbabwe 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mongolia 
 
Congo, Rep Morocco 
 
Costa Rica Nicaragua 
 
Cote d'Ivoire Pakistan 
 
Croatia Panama 
 
Dominican Republic Paraguay 
 
Egypt Peru 
 
El Salvador Poland 
 
Ethiopia Romania 
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Table B5:  2SLS Regression Results to Address Endogeneity, 1989-2006 
Model 
Estimation Method 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
(1) 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
(3) 
Linear 
2SLS 
Coefficient 
(4) 
A) SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT     
Annual Debt Forgiveness 
 
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness 
 
Debt Forgiveness Signal 
0.2708 
(0.8196) 
     -0.2805 
    (0.1344)** 
0.0017 
(0.0032) 
-0.3760 
(0.4566) 
 
 
    -0.2540 
(0.1561) 
 
 
 
 
     0.0001 
    (0.0021) 
B) DEVELOPMENT     
Per Capita GDP 
 
Population Growth 
0.0034 
(0.0410) 
    -0.0108 
 (0.0063)* 
0.0478 
    (0.0199)** 
0.0024 
(0.0035) 
0.0017 
 (0.0411) 
-0.0087 
 (0.0079) 
0.0446 
(0.0193)** 
0.0011 
(0.0030) 
C) OPENNESS     
(Exports + Imports) 0.0915 
  (0.0489)* 
0.0283 
(0.0209) 
      0.0899 
  (0.0508)* 
0.0196 
(0.0144) 
D) ECONOMIC STRUCTURE     
Services Value Added 
 
Manufacture Value Added 
-0.2299 
 (0.4342) 
0.0375 
(0.3496) 
-0.2302 
 (0.1920) 
-0.1188 
(0.1688) 
-0.3246 
(0.2182) 
-0.0576 
(0.1422) 
-0.0833 
 (0.0756) 
0.0162 
 (0.0656) 
E) FOREIGN AID     
Loans 
 
Grants 
-0.8665 
(0.5764) 
2.1214 
(2.4814) 
      0.0874 
     (0.1781) 
   1.0803 
     (1.2320) 
     -0.8213 
(0.6459) 
      2.2647 
(2.0784) 
0.0985 
(0.1278) 
0.5791 
(0.7796) 
Hansen (p-value) 0.7246 0.0152 0.9228 0.0095 
Observations 407 407 407 408 
Notes: All specifications contain year dummies. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the  
5% level, and * significance at 10% level. Dependent variable is the tax ratios - tax revenues divided by GDP.  
The standard errors for the fixed effects model are robust to arbitrary serial correlation.  
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